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END THE POPULARITY CONTEST: A PROPOSAL
FOR SECOND AMENDMENT “TYPE OF WEAPON”
ANALYSIS
Cody J. Jacobs*
The Supreme Court’s recognition in District of Columbia v. Heller
of an individual Second Amendment right to bear arms for selfdefense raised many questions about the scope of that right. One issue
that will become increasingly important in the years ahead, but that
has received relatively little attention from scholars and courts, is the
question of which “arms” are protected by that right. Heller purports
to establish a test that asks whether the weapon at issue is in
“common use” at the time the case is decided. This Article critiques
that test, arguing that it creates poor incentives, is difficult to apply,
and, most importantly, is disconnected from the central component of
the Second Amendment right—self-defense. This Article proposes an
alternative test that asks whether the weapon at issue is a reasonable
choice for armed self-defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller1
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own a
gun, separate and apart from service in a militia,2 scholars and
lower courts have labored to define the scope of that right and the
proper method of analysis for determining when the right is violated.
Much of the major litigation and scholarship about the Second
Amendment since Heller has focused on whether, and to what
degree, the right recognized in Heller in the context of home selfdefense extends outside of the home.3 Courts and scholars have also

1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. See id. at 599. The full text of the Second Amendment provides: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015); Drake v. Filko, 724
F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-827, 2014 WL 126071 (U.S. May 5,
2014); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
422 (2013); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 708
F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms
Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695 (2012); Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second
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examined whether Second Amendment claims should be analyzed
using the traditional “level-of-scrutiny” analysis used in other areas
of constitutional law or if the Second Amendment calls for a different
“historical” or “categorical” approach.4 This Article focuses on a
different question: How should courts determine which weapons the
Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right to use for selfdefense? This question is likely to become increasingly important to
courts as weaponry becomes more sophisticated and both assault
weapons and bans on assault weapons become more popular.
This Article examines the “common use” test established in
Heller and the attempted application of that test by lower courts.
That test asks whether the weapon at issue is in common use at the
time the case is decided.5 This test is not easy to apply or desirable
in the modern era of weaponry, nor does precedent or the Second

Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing
Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2012); Jordan E. Pratt, A First
Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92
NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014); see also Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller
and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1488 (2014)
(“The most consequential cases in defining the contours of the Second Amendment,
however, relate to the right to carry firearms outside the home.”).
4. See, e.g., Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167–68 (noting that the courts of appeals
“have grappled with varying sliding-scale and tiered-scrutiny approaches, agreeing
as a general matter that ‘the level of scrutiny applied to gun control regulations
depends on the regulation’s burden on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms,’” but also noting that “an alternative approach for the most severe cases . . .
[where] . . . [a] law effect[s] a ‘destruction of the right’ rather than merely burdening
it”); Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(“In my view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun
bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second
Amendment Right—Post-Heller Standard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (2009);
Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of
Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011); Stacey
L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s A Court to Do Post-McDonald?,
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012); Michael J. Habib, The Second Amendment
Standard of Review: The Quintessential Clean-Slate for Sliding-Scale Scrutiny,
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2012, at 13; Ryan L. Card, Note, An Opinion
Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Adopt A Standard of
Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches
for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 259
(2009); Andrew Peace, Comment, A Snowball’s Chance in Heller: Why Decastro’s
Substantial Burden Standard is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C.L. REV. ELECTRONIC
SUPPLEMENT 175 (2013), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/
iss6/14.
5. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25.
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Amendment’s text require it. Indeed, lower courts have already been
shirking the common use test rather than following it to its logical—
and disturbing—conclusions that lead to both over-protecting and
under-protecting Second Amendment rights.6 This Article proposes
an alternative test that calls for courts to objectively examine
whether the weapon at issue is a reasonable weapon for self-defense.
This inquiry looks at the weapon’s usefulness in a self-defense
situation, its potential dangerousness to innocent bystanders, and
the likelihood that the weapon will be employed for illegal purposes.
Although this test is not perfect, it would protect the core right of
armed self-defense recognized in Heller7 while allowing regulation of
the most dangerous weapons.
This Article begins in Part II with an overview of the growing
popularity of assault weapons and large capacity magazines and
government efforts to ban these weapons. Part III summarizes the
Heller decision and the common use test it describes for determining
which arms the Second Amendment protects. Part III also describes
the analytical framework courts have settled on for analyzing
Second Amendment claims since Heller was decided. Part IV
describes how courts have struggled to apply the common use test
and how these struggles illustrate fundamental problems with that

6. See infra Part V.
7. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (recognizing self-defense as “the central
component of the right” to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment). Of course,
the validity of the central holding of Heller—that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right separate from service in a militia—has been and continues to be the
subject of rigorous scholarly debate. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The
Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 630
(2008) (“Scalia’s use of historical texts is entirely arbitrary and result oriented.
Atypical texts that support Scalia . . . are pronounced to be influential, while
generally influential texts . . . are dismissed as unrepresentative. Such an approach
is intellectually dishonest and suggests that Justice Scalia’s brand of plain-meaning
originalism is little more than a smoke screen for his own political agenda.”) (citation
omitted); David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (2008) (praising Heller’s recognition of the Second
Amendment as codifying a pre-existing right and critiquing the dissenting opinions);
see also McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 914 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(collecting articles critiquing Heller); William G. Merkel, The District of Columbia v.
Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 349, 349 (2009) (“The majority holding—that the Second Amendment was
originally understood to protect the right to possess any commonly held weapon for
purposes unrelated to militia service such as self-defense and hunting—requires
misreading, misunderstanding, or ignoring the bulk of relevant evidence . . . .”).
Although this debate is surely an important one, this Article assumes the validity
and ongoing vitality of Heller’s individual right holding.
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test. Part V examines five of the most fundamental problems with
the common use test, discusses alternatives to the common use test
proposed in scholarship, and proposes an alternative test based on
reasonable self-defense.
I. TYPES OF WEAPONS – A BREWING CONTROVERSY
Over the last few decades, the weaponry available to civilians
has become more sophisticated and deadly. Recently—particularly
since the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School—activists
and legislators have been increasingly calling for—and in some cases
enacting—new restrictions on large capacity ammunition
magazines8 and assault weapons. 9 These trends set the stage for

8. See Large Capacity Ammunition Magazines Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (May 31, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/large-capacityammunition-magazines-policy-summary/ (defining “large capacity” magazines as
magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition). Ammunition
magazines are containers that hold ammunition cartridges and feed them into a
firearm. See OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS 900 (2003). The “capacity” of a magazine refers to the number of
cartridges a magazine can hold at one time. Large capacity ammunition magazines
are generally considered by most laws to be those larger than ten rounds, but some
laws set a higher number. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra.
9. See Brad Plumer, Everything You Need to Know About the Assault Weapons
Ban, in One Post, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonkblog/wp/2012/12/17/everything-you-need-to-know-about-banning-assaultweapons-in-one-post/. Some gun rights enthusiasts take issue with the phrases
“assault weapons” and “large capacity ammunition magazines” calling them
“pejorative.” See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7, Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2014) (No.
3:13-cv-00739), 2013 WL 4511019 (“The Act bans standard magazines in common use
that it calls ‘large capacity magazines . . . .’”.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at n.3,
Silveira v. Lokyer, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003) (No. 03-51), 2003 WL 23194550 (“The Court
should be aware that the pejorative expression ‘assault weapon’ is used by antifirearm activists to frighten and mislead, not to inform.”). The issue about the
definition of “assault weapons” stems from the way certain assault rifles modeled on
military rifles have been marketed to civilians. This issue is discussed further below
in Part II.A and in note 19, infra. For clarity, this Article will use the phrase “assault
weapons” to refer to guns that were deemed assault weapons under the now-defunct
federal assault weapons ban or are generally considered assault weapons by bans
that currently exist in some states.
The “large capacity ammunition magazine” issue is more a dispute over
semantics. Gun rights supporters dislike the phrase “large capacity” because it
implies that these magazines are somehow out of the ordinary and therefore not
protected by the Second Amendment under the “common use” test. As discussed
below in Part V, this kind of dispute highlights the flawed nature of the inquiry that
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legal clashes that will force courts to carefully examine the issue of
what types of weapons are protected by the Second Amendment.
A. The Proliferation of Assault Weapons
Although fully automatic and semi-automatic10 firearms became
popular in the American military as early as World War I,11 the most
common weapons on the civilian market in the twentieth century up
until the 1980s bore little resemblance to those used on the
battlefield. For example, although semi-automatic handguns were
used by the military as early as 1911,12 revolvers dominated the
American handgun market as recently as 1989.13
The 1980s marked a shift in the gun industry toward the
manufacture and marketing of civilian versions of military firearms.
For example, the nine millimeter (“9mm”) semi-automatic pistol was
widely marketed to the domestic population at the same time it was

the test requires. We would be better off disputing whether a given magazine size is
actually reasonable for self-defense than whether it is subjectively “large.”
10. Automatic weapons continuously fire bullets while the trigger is depressed
(until the available rounds are expended), while semi-automatic weapons fire only
one bullet each time the trigger is depressed. See Jim Supica, A Brief History of
Firearms, NAT. RIFLE ASS’N, http://www.nramuseum.org/gun-info-research/a-briefhistory-of-firearms.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). Single-shot guns (guns that are
neither automatic nor semi-automatic) require some action by the user in order to
load a new bullet into the chamber each time the gun is fired. See Adam Weinstein,
A Non-Gun-Owner’s Guide to Guns, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 21, 2012, 7:01 AM)
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/semi-automatic-gun-assault-weapondefinitions. For example, a traditional single-action revolver requires the user to
“cock” or pull back the hammer on the back of the gun, which rotates the cylinder so
as to line up a new cartridge between the hammer and the barrel, and then to
release the hammer by pulling a trigger. See Tom Harris, How Revolvers Work, HOW
STUFF WORKS (Mar. 7, 2002), http://science.howstuffworks.com/revolver.htm.
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN BULL, WORLD WAR I TRENCH WARFARE (1) 1914–16, at
11–12 (2002); Scott Engen, The History of the 1911 Pistol, BROWNING (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://www.browning.com/library/infonews/detail.asp?ID=301. Notably, the first wellfunctioning “machine gun” was invented much earlier, during the Civil War in 1862
by Richard Gatling. See JULIA KELLER, MR. GATLING’S TERRIBLE MARVEL 1, 5
(2008).
12. See,
e.g.,
M-1911
Pistol
History,
M-1911
PISTOLS
ORG.,
http://www.m1911.org/full_history.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
13. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S. CIVILIAN
FIREARMS MARKET 14 (2011), http://www.vpc.org/studies/militarization.pdf
[hereinafter VIOLENCE POLICY CTR.]; see also M.D. Johnson, The Trend Toward
Autoloaders, in THE GUN DIGEST BOOK OF GUNS FOR PERSONAL SELF DEFENSE 36
(Kevin Michalowski ed., 2004) (noting the trend in the 1980s of police departments
and civilians switching from revolvers to semi-automatic handguns).
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becoming the standard military side-arm.14 Eventually, the 9mm
and similar semi-automatic pistols displaced the revolver as the
most popular type of handgun on the civilian market.15
The gun industry employed a similar strategy in the market for
long guns. Beginning in the 1980s, the industry began to promote
semi-automatic versions of assault rifles previously only marketed to
the military.16 For example, the M-16, an assault rifle used by the
military, was marketed to civilians as the AR-15.17 The main
difference between the military versions of these firearms and their
civilian counterparts was the ability to fire in fully automatic
mode.18 While the M-16 and similar military assault rifles usually
have a small lever that allows the user to switch between semiautomatic and fully automatic mode, their civilian counterparts do
not and are restricted to firing only in semi-automatic mode.19
The significance of this difference is hotly debated20 but both
sides agree that—other than the ability to fire in fully automatic

14. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 14–16.
15. See id.
16. See TOM DIAZ, THE LAST GUN 159–60 (2013). The heavy promotion of these
rifles and other military firearms was likely motivated, at least in part, by declining
handgun sales. See id. at 160.
17. See id. at 159–60; VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 25, 29.
Originally the AR-15 was sold under a patent held by Colt Industries. DIAZ, supra
note 16, at 159–60. Once that patent expired, numerous other manufacturers began
selling similar guns, including the M&P15, which was used by James Holmes in the
2012 Aurora, Colorado movie theatre shooting. Id. at 144–45, 160.
18. See id. at 157–58.
19. Id. at 157.
20. This is the primary dispute over the use of the phrase “assault weapons.”
Pro-gun activists argue that “assault weapons” is a purely political term and that the
phrase “assault rifles” should only be understood to refer to long guns capable of
firing in fully automatic mode. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In
Re 101 California Street: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the
Manufacture and Sale of “Assault Weapons,” 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 42–43
(1997) (“Prior to 1989, the term ‘assault weapon’ did not exist in the lexicon of
firearms. It is a political term, developed by anti-gun publicists to expand the
category of ‘assault rifles’ so as to allow an attack on as many additional firearms as
possible on the basis of undefined ‘evil’ appearance.”); David B. Kopel, Rational Basis
Analysis of “Assault Weapon” Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381, 387 (1994) (“No
‘assault rifle’ (by Defense Intelligence Agency definition) is an ‘assault weapon’
because all ‘assault rifles’ are automatic, while no ‘assault weapons’ are automatic.
‘Assault rifles’ are used by the military, whereas no ‘assault weapon’ is used by the
military. ‘Assault rifles’ are all rifles, but ‘assault weapons’ include semiautomatic
rifles, semiautomatic shotguns, revolver-action shotguns, semiautomatic handguns,
and semiautomatic airguns.”).
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mode—these civilian guns have all the same features of their
military counterparts.21 Both sides also seem to agree that these
guns have become more popular in recent years.22
This rise in popularity—coupled with the use of assault weapons
in many high profile mass shootings—has put these guns in the
crosshairs of legislators, setting up a clash in the courts to settle
whether (and/or to what extent) assault weapons are protected by
the Second Amendment.
B. The Renewed Popularity Of Assault Weapon Bans
Assault weapon bans in the United States have generally worked
in one of three ways: they ban a list of predetermined gun models,
ban guns with a certain number of specified features, or ban guns
based on some combination of both.23 Laws using a “feature based”
test typically look to whether the gun has features that are common
in civilian models of military weapons, such as a telescopic or
“folding” stock, a pistol grip protruding unusually far beneath the
action of the weapon, or a barrel capable of accepting a flash
suppressor.24 Such bans prohibit many of the military-style rifles,
discussed above, that became popular beginning in the 1980s.

21. See DIAZ, supra note 16, at 156 (noting that other than the ability to fire in
fully automatic mode, civilian assault rifles “function identically” to their military
counterparts); Liz Klimas, So What Is an ‘Assault Rifle’ Really? We Look at the
Definitions and How the Term Is ‘Demonized,’ THE BLAZE (Jan. 11, 2013, 10:22 AM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/01/11/so-what-is-an-assault-rifle-really-welook-at-the-definitions-and-how-the-term-is-demonized/ (“[T]he only difference
[between military and civilian assault rifles] is that one is fully automatic and the
other is semi-automatic.”).
22. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 29, 40; see also Brief for
Appellants at 46, Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-7036) (citing
evidence from the district court record indicating that “[s]ome two million AR-15 type
rifles are in civilian hands”); Justin Peters, How Many Assault Weapons Are There in
America? How Much Would It Cost the Government To Buy Them Back?, SLATE (Dec.
20, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2012/12/20/assault_rifle_stats_how_
many_assault_rifles_are_there_in_america.html (estimating that there may be as
many as 3.75 million AR-15s in the United States).
23. See, e.g., Brian Roth, Comment, Reconsidering a Federal Assault Weapons
Ban in the Wake of the Aurora, Oak Creek, and Portland Shootings: Is It
Constitutional in the Post-Heller Era?, 37 NOVA L. REV. 405, 413–14 (2013).
24. See, e.g., id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1484 (2009) (noting that assault weapons bans “often focus on
features . . . such as folding stocks, pistol grips, bayonet mounts, flash suppressors,
or (for assault handguns but not assault rifles) magazines that attach outside the
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The first modern assault weapon ban in the United States was
passed in California in 1989 in response to a series of high-profile
shootings there in which gunmen used assault weapons.25 Other
states followed suit, and by 1994, five states and several local
governments had passed some form of assault weapon ban.26 Then,
in 1994, Congress enacted a federal ban on assault weapons and
large capacity ammunition magazines.27 The ban had a “sunset”
provision under which it would expire in ten years if not renewed by
Congress.28 During the time the ban was in effect, two additional
states passed some version of their own assault weapon ban.29 The
federal assault weapon ban expired in 2004, ten years after its
effective date pursuant to its sunset provision.30 During the years
between the federal assault weapon ban’s expiration in 2004 and
2012, no other states adopted new assault weapon prohibitions.
At the end of 2012, the country’s focus turned back to assault
weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines after the Sandy

pistol grip or barrel shrouds that can be used as hand-holds.”).
25. See Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban
on Assault Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 489 (1992); Carl Ingram, Assault
Gun Ban Wins Final Vote: Deukmejian’s Promised Approval Would Make It 1st Such
U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1989, at 1, 27, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
1989-05-19/news/mn-112_1_assault-weapons-ban-military-style-assault-types-ofsemiautomatic-rifles (“While the [California assault weapons ban] legislation was
announced in December, it was the Jan. 17 murders of five Southeast Asian refugee
children in a Stockton schoolyard that provided the emotional ingredient required to
advance the bill and gain the support of [California Governor George] Deukmejian,
long an opponent of new controls on guns.”). West Virginia had a law prior to
California’s that regulated assault weapons, but that law was “of limited utility since
it did not even define the term ‘assault weapon.’” Robert A. O’Hare, Jr. & Jorge
Pedreira, An Uncertain Right: The Second Amendment and the Assault Weapon
Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 179, 196 (1992).
26. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS—A LEGAL
PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION 3 (2004), http://smartgunlaws.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/Banning_Assault_Weapons_A_Legal_Primer_8.05_entire.pd
f [hereinafter LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE]; see also Abrams, supra note 25, at
489 (noting that as of 1992 “[o]ver thirty major cities” had enacted assault weapons
laws).
27. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, §§ 110101, 110103 Stat. 1796 (1994).
28. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 110105(2).
29. See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 26, at 3.
30. See, e.g., Jill Lawrence, Federal Ban on Assault Weapons Expires, USA
TODAY (Sept. 14, 2004, 12:03 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2004-09-12-weapons-ban_x.htm.
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Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown, Connecticut.31 The
Sandy Hook gunman killed twenty elementary school students,
seven adults, and himself primarily using a .223 Bushmaster rifle,32
which is a variation on the AR-15.33 The gunman also used large
capacity ammunition magazines.34 The Newtown tragedy led to a
nationwide push for stronger gun control laws, including bans on
assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines.35
Although higher profile efforts at the federal level have failed to
revive the defunct national assault weapon ban,36 several states
passed laws either strengthening existing bans on assault weapons
and large capacity ammunition magazines or enacting new ones.37
One thing the debates at both the state and federal levels on these
issues had in common (whether those debates ended in new laws or
not) was that opponents and supporters of these proposals hotly
debated their constitutionality. For example, one legislator in
California called a proposed bill that would have expanded
California’s existing assault weapons ban an attempt to “erase the
Second Amendment.”38 Proponents of the bill to renew the federal

31. See N.Y. TIMES, State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year After Newtown, Dec.
10, 2013, at A20, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-lawsenacted-in-the-year-since-newtown.html.
32. James Barron, Pupils Were All Shot Multiple Times with a Semiautomatic,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at 1, 27, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/
16/nyregion/gunman-kills-20-children-at-school-in-connecticut-28-dead-inall.html?_r=0. The gunman killed his own mother at home prior to going to the
school and killing twenty children and six school employees. Id. at 27.
33. See Lee Ferran & Shushannah Walshe, Newtown Massacre: What Is a
Bushmaster .223?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/newtow
n-massacre-bushmaster-223/story?id=18000884.
34. See Matt Ferner, Adam Lanza, Sandy Hook Shooter, Used High-Capacity
Magazines From Colorado’s Magpul Industries, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013,
2:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/adam-lanza-sandy-hook-maga
zines-magpul_n_4344175.html.
35. See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Shelby Baird, The Shooting Cycle, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 1513 (2014) (noting the sharp increase in support for a federal assault weapons
ban and other gun laws following the Newtown shooting).
36. Ed O’Keefe, Gun Background Check Compromise, Assault Weapon Ban Fail
in Senate, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2013/04/17/senate-to-vote-on-amendments-to-gun-bill-with-backgroundcheck-plan-in-doubt/.
37. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 31, at A20.
38. Awr Hawkins, CA Republican: ‘Assault Weapons’ Ban ‘Erases’ Second
Amendment, BREITBART (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/
2013/10/07/Pending-CA-Assault-Weapons-Ban-Erases-The-Second-Amendment.
Indeed, the bill that the legislator was referring to, SB 374, was ultimately vetoed by
the governor because the governor did not believe that the “bill’s blanket ban on
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assault weapons ban argued that it was consistent with the Second
Amendment, with one senator noting that “[t]here are reasonable
limits on each [constitutional] amendment” and another arguing
that “[i]t is hard to imagine that it would [not] be a violation of the
First Amendment for somebody to yell fire in a crowded theater but
[that it would be] a violation of the Second Amendment to prevent
somebody from bringing a hundred-round magazine into a crowded
theater . . . .”39 Even the bill’s stated purpose included an implicit
argument for its constitutionality under Heller, stating that the bill
was intended “[t]o regulate assault weapons, to ensure that the right
to keep and bear arms is not unlimited, and for other purposes.”40
The series of new laws that did pass at the state and local level
set the stage for court battles over the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection for different types of guns and magazines
between those governments and proponents of expanded gun rights.
II. POST-HELLER SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE—HELLER, THE
COMMON USE TEST, AND THE TWO-STEP TEST
The decision in Heller was groundbreaking in that it recognized,
for the first time, that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to bear arms for self-defense unconnected to militia service.
However, the opinion was somewhat vague on what the proper the
method of analysis was for Second Amendment claims. Lower courts
have filled in some of the gap, with most settling on a version of a
two-part analysis: (1) asking whether the conduct at issue is
protected by the Second Amendment and, if it is, (2) selecting and
applying an appropriate level of scrutiny.41

semi-automatic rifles would reduce criminal activity or enhance public safety enough
to warrant this infringement on gun owners’ rights.” See Veto Message from Jerry
Brown, Governor, to the Members of the Cal. State Senate (Oct. 11, 2013), available
at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_374_2013_Veto_Message.pdf.
39. Nicole Flatow, Senators Destroy Ted Cruz’s Argument Against the Assault
Weapons Ban, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
justice/2013/03/14/1720351/senators-destroy-ted-cruzs-argument-against-the-assaultweapons-ban/.
40. S. 150, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (emphasis added); cf. D.C. v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited.”).
41. See infra Part V.
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A. District of Columbia v. Heller
1. Embracing an Individual Right
In Heller, the plaintiff challenged a set of laws in the District of
Columbia that effectively banned handguns in the home.42 The
Supreme Court held, in a five to four decision, that these laws
violated the Second Amendment. The Heller decision marked a
watershed moment in courts’ understanding of the Second
Amendment. Prior to that decision, courts had generally agreed that
the Second Amendment only protected a “collective right” to own
firearms for the purpose of service in a well-regulated militia.43
Heller emphatically rejected this “collective right” view, instead
finding that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to
use firearms for self-defense.44 Although the Court acknowledged
that the framers’ purpose in including the Second Amendment in the
Bill of Rights may have been tied to militia service, the Court found
that the framers’ method of accomplishing that purpose was to codify
a pre-existing right to keep and bear arms.45 The Court announced
that the pre-existing right’s “central component” was the right to use
arms for self-defense.46
The Court reached this conclusion first by parsing the text of the
Second Amendment and then through a long historical analysis that
examined the public understanding of the “right to bear arms” prior
to, contemporaneous with, and in the decades following the Second
Amendment’s adoption.47 The analysis relied heavily on
contemporary commentators, news accounts, and case law
interpreting analogous state constitutional provisions.48

42. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–76. The plaintiff also challenged a law requiring
guns kept in the home to be completely disassembled and unloaded when not in use.
Id.
43. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over
the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 708 (2012) (“For most of the
twentieth century, the meaning of the Second Amendment seemed well settled.
Courts consistently read it as guaranteeing a right to have and use guns only for
purposes of organized state militia activity.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Heller &
Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1412–13
(2009) (noting that Heller represented the first time in history the Supreme Court
had struck down a law as violation of the Second Amendment).
44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 576–619.
48. Id. at 602–19.
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Once the Court found that such a right existed, it had no trouble
finding that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban violated that
right.49 However, in contrast to the lengthy discussion of whether
the right at issue was an individual one or a “collective” one (which
was also the primary subject of Justice Stevens’ dissent), the Court
said relatively little about the method of analysis that was to be
applied in future Second Amendment claims. It did not, for example,
lay out a particular level of scrutiny to be applied in Second
Amendment cases. Although the majority rejected the interestbalancing test resembling intermediate scrutiny proposed by Justice
Breyer’s dissent, it did not lay out its own test but instead simply
noted that the District’s scheme would fail “[u]nder any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights.”50 The Court did acknowledge that the Second
Amendment right it recognized was “not unlimited” and laid out a
few categories of regulation that were “longstanding” and therefore
“presumptively lawful” under the Second Amendment, such as laws
prohibiting felons from owning firearms.51 However, even that list
came with the caveat that it was “not exhaustive.”52 The Court did
not explain its methodology for creating the list.53
2. The “Common Use” Test
The Heller Court also spilled little ink on the question of what
types of “arms” the Second Amendment protects. In discussing the
text of the Second Amendment, the Court endorsed the seemingly
broad view that the term “arms” encompassed any “weapo[n] of
offence, or armour of defence” whether or not such an arm was the

49. Id. at 628–29.
050. Id. at 628. The Court also struck down the District of Columbia’s
requirement that guns be kept completely disassembled and unloaded when not in
use, finding that the requirement made “it impossible for citizens to use [firearms]
for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and [was therefore] unconstitutional.” Id.
at 630.
51. Id. at 626–27. The Court also said that prohibitions on firearm ownership
by the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, and laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms were presumptively constitutional. Id.
52. Id. at 627 n.26.
53. See id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am similarly puzzled by the
majority’s list, in Part III of its opinion, of provisions that in its view would survive
Second Amendment scrutiny. . . . Why these? Is it that similar restrictions existed in
the late 18th century? The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues.”).
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type used in war.54 The Court also sharply dismissed the idea that
the Second Amendment only protects the particular arms in
existence at the time of the Amendment’s adoption, finding that the
“Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at
the time of the founding.”55
After this brief discussion about the meaning of the term “arms,”
the types of arms covered by the Second Amendment did not come
up in the Court’s extensive historical analysis, and the issue was
only raised again in a section of the Court’s opinion discussing
whether the individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment conflicted with any of the Court’s prior holdings.56 In
that section, the Court attempted to distinguish its individual right
holding from its 1939 holding in United States v. Miller,57 that a law
prohibiting the transportation of an unregistered short-barreled
shotgun in interstate commerce did not violate the Second
Amendment.58
In Miller, the Court found that “[i]n the absence of any evidence
tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled
shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument.”59 The Heller majority was mainly concerned
with refuting Justice Stevens’ argument in dissent that Miller
supported a collective right interpretation of the Second
Amendment, and only briefly touched on the “type of weapon” test
Miller appears to suggest:
Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military
equipment” could mean that only those weapons useful in
warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of
the opinion, since it would mean that . . . restrictions on
machineguns . . . might be unconstitutional, machineguns
being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller’s
“ordinary military equipment” language must be read in
tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily when called for
[militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear
bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in
common use at the time.” The traditional militia was formed

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 624–25.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Id. at 178.
Id.
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from a pool of men bringing arms “in common use at the
time” for lawful purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial
and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by
militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home
were one and the same.” Indeed, that is precisely the way in
which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the
purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to
say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.60
Thus, in distancing itself from the “startling reading” of Miller
that Miller’s military usefulness test would seem to suggest, the
Court formulated a “common use” test focusing on whether the
weapons at issue are currently in common use for lawful purposes
such as self-defense.61 Compared with the rest of the opinion, the
Court’s selection of this test was based on relatively little historical
analysis. The Court simply noted that people in the militia at the
time of the founding commonly used the personal weapons they
brought with them to service.62
The Court briefly alluded to the common use test again in the
context of applying the newly recognized individual Second
Amendment right to the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, finding
that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied
to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the
most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection
of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”63 The
Court rejected the District of Columbia’s argument that because long
guns were still legal, it could ban handguns:
It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American
people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential
self-defense weapon. There are many reasons that a citizen
may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store
in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it

60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 624.
62. Id. at 624–25. Even that assertion is somewhat debatable. Justice Breyer
pointed out in dissent that some militias at the time of the founding required specific
types of guns, not just whatever weapons the citizens called to serve in the militia
happened to have around. Id. at 716 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that some militia
statutes at the time found handguns “‘acceptable’ only for certain special militiamen
(generally, certain soldiers on horseback), while requiring muskets or rifles for the
general infantry.”).
63. Id. at 628–29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

16

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:XXX

cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker;
it is easier to use for those without the upper-body strength
to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with
one hand while the other hand dials the police. Whatever the
reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete
prohibition of their use is invalid.64
Again, the Court simply reiterated (adding the somewhat cryptic
introduction of “it is enough to note”) that handguns are the most
popular arm for self-defense purposes. Interestingly, in making this
assertion about the popularity of handguns, the Court cited only one
source: the D.C. Circuit’s opinion below.65 That opinion, in turn, cites
to a single academic paper to support that proposition.66 That paper
compiled the results of several surveys from 1988 to 1993 in order to
estimate the number of defensive uses of firearms in the United
States during that period.67 However, as the authors of that paper
admit, some of the surveys used to compile these estimates only
asked about handguns while others asked about all guns. Thus the
paper “did not separately establish how many of the [defensive gun
use incidents] involved handguns and how many involved other
types of guns.”68
This is not to suggest that the Court’s conclusion that handguns
are the most popular weapon for self-defense was wrong—it almost
certainly was correct. Rather, the issue is that the Court’s cursory
citation to the lower court’s mentioning this study does not provide
any guidance about how the Court was applying the “common use”
test to reach the conclusion it did. Did the Court find that handguns
were the most commonly chosen weapon because handguns are the

64. Id. at 629.
65. Id. at 628–29 (citing Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
66. Parker, 478 F.3d at 400 (“Indeed, the pistol is the most preferred firearm in
the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family.”) (citing Gary
Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of SelfDefense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182–83 (1995)).
67. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence
and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182–84
(1995).
68. Id. at 164. Moreover, the larger conclusions and methodology of that paper
have been subject to significant criticism since it was published. See, e.g., Egon D.
Cohen & Kristina M. Johnson, The Restricted Firearms License: A Proposal to
Preserve Second Amendment Rights and Reduce Gun Violence in the United States,
31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 10, 11–12 & n.12 (2013),
http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/restricted-firearms-license-proposal-preserve-secondamendment-rights-and-reduce-gun.
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weapon most often used in self-defense situations or simply because
Americans most commonly purchase or own handguns for that
purpose? Is survey data that is well over a decade old sufficient proof
of today’s “common use?” These questions were left unanswered, and
as discussed below, the Court’s lack of guidance has been reflected in
lower courts’ unwillingness to deeply engage in common use
analysis.69
Justice Breyer’s dissent briefly critiqued the “common use” test,
noting that it creates odd incentives for states:
According to the majority’s reasoning, if Congress and the
States lift restrictions on the possession and use of
machineguns, and people buy machineguns to protect their
homes, the Court will have to reverse course and find that
the Second Amendment does, in fact, protect the individual
self-defense-related right to possess a machinegun. On the
majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a
particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon,
Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for
once it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the
constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the majority
determines what regulations are permissible by looking to
see what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for
believing that the Framers intended such circular
reasoning.70
However, Justice Breyer did not specifically suggest an
alternative type of weapon test, despite describing his own “interestbalancing” test that he would apply to Second Amendment claims
generally.71
Thus, while taking a monumental step in recognizing an
individual Second Amendment right, the Court left lower courts with
little to guide them in analyzing future claims—other than claims
regarding handgun bans identical to the one in Heller—and even
less guidance on how to decide what weapons are protected by the

69. See infra Part IV.
70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Justice Breyer proposed that courts apply something in between rational
basis and strict scrutiny to Second Amendment claims—likely a form of intermediate
scrutiny. Id. at 689–90 (suggesting that a court should not “effectively presume
either constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in
strict scrutiny). Rather [a court should ask] whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary
effects upon other important governmental interests.”).
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Second Amendment. In McDonald v. City of Chicago,72 the Court’s
only return to the Second Amendment since Heller, the Court found
that the Second Amendment protects a fundamental right
incorporated against state and local governments but did not provide
any further insight into the appropriate analysis for Second
Amendment cases or into the meaning of the “common use” test for
arms described in Heller.73
B. The Two-Step Test
Because the Supreme Court has not established a methodology
for analyzing Second Amendment claims, lower courts have been
given a wide berth to elaborate on the scope of the Second
Amendment right recognized in Heller. Since Heller, all of the
federal courts of appeal that have done any in-depth analysis of the
Second Amendment have settled on some form of a two-part test
that: (1) asks whether the law at issue burdens conduct protected by
the Second Amendment and, if there is such a burden, (2), asks
courts to apply an “appropriate” level of scrutiny given the severity
of the burden on Second Amendment rights.74
Critics of the two-step test—most of whom favor broader Second
Amendment rights—prefer a “scope only” approach that would
simply ask whether the law burdens the Second Amendment as the

72. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
73. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750, 767–68, 778.
74. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that the two-step approach “has
emerged as the prevailing approach” and adopting that approach), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1364 (2014); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 375 (2012); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22–26 (1st Cir.
2011); Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614
F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.
2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (adopting a “substantial
burden” test where “heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that
(like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a
substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm
for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes)”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 838 (2013).
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have summarily rejected a few Second
Amendment challenges to federal prohibitions on certain criminals possessing
firearms and on the possession of particularly dangerous weapons, see, e.g., United
States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1182–85 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rozier, 598
F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010), but have not yet engaged in an in-depth
discussion of the standard of review for Second Amendment cases.
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amendment was understood at the time of its ratification.
Proponents of this approach argue that if a law prohibits conduct
protected by the Second Amendment, it should be struck down
without resort to the kind of “interest-balancing” the Heller majority
expressly disclaimed.75
In any case, courts that have applied the two-step approach as
well as those arguing for the “scope only” approach both largely
agree that the scope inquiry is determined by a historical analysis
that looks at whether the challenged conduct was within the scope
that the Second Amendment was understood to have at the time it
was ratified and for at least some amount of time after ratification.76
“It begins with the pre-ratification ‘historical background of the
Second Amendment,’ since ‘the Second Amendment . . . codified a
preexisting right.’ Next, it turns to whatever sources shed light on
the ‘public understanding [of the Second Amendment] in the period
after its enactment or ratification,’ such as nineteenth-century
judicial interpretations and legal commentary.”77

75. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In my
view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and
regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as
strict or intermediate scrutiny.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-42), 2013 WL 3484362, at *24
(complaining that under the two-step approach “many courts simply dispense with
the first step of discerning a right through interpretation, only assuming that a right
(of abstract dimension) is implicated, thus carefully avoiding any holding that the
right has any substantive content. By assuming, rather than finding and thus
defining the right’s existence, courts reduce the right to a cypher that cannot
withstand the second step’s application, always alleged to be intermediate
scrutiny.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); see also Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego,
742 F.3d 1144, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (arguing for using the scope only approach in the
“most severe cases” that involve a “complete destruction” of Second Amendment
rights), vacated and re’g en banc granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015); cf. Allen
Rostron, supra note 43, at 706–07 (“The lower courts, frustrated by the
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested by
Justice Scalia, have steered in other directions. They have effectively embraced the
sort of interest-balancing approach that Justice Scalia condemned, adopting an
intermediate scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to
legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on
guns being upheld.”).
76. See, e.g., Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150–51; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at
194.
77. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1151 (citations omitted) (alterations in original)
(quoting D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)). But see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons were found to be “longstanding” by Heller despite the fact that such
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Once a court applying the two-step approach determines whether
the law at issue burdens or regulates conduct protected by the
Second Amendment, the court will then determine the proper level
of scrutiny to apply to the law. The closer a law comes to burdening
the “core” right identified in Heller—the right to possess a firearm
for self-defense in the home—the higher the level of scrutiny applied
to the law.78 Usually courts decline to apply rational basis scrutiny79
to a law found to burden conduct protected by the Second
Amendment (because that standard was specifically rejected by the
majority in Heller) and instead will either apply strict or
intermediate scrutiny,80 depending on the severity of the burden on
Second Amendment rights.81
This mode of analysis has led courts to apply intermediate
scrutiny to most gun control laws that have been reviewed after
Heller, because most of these laws either burden only conduct

prohibitions did not exist until the early twentieth century, and therefore, concluding
that other prohibitions dating to that era could be considered “longstanding” and
presumptively lawful), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (“[T]he level of scrutiny should depend on (1) ‘how close the law
comes to the core of the Second Amendment right,’ and (2) ‘the severity of the law’s
burden on the right.’”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 & 93 n.17
(2d Cir. 2012) (“Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should
apply to laws that burden the ‘core’ Second Amendment protection identified in
Heller, we believe that applying less than strict scrutiny when the regulation does
not burden the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent sense in
this context and is in line with the approach taken by our sister circuits.”) (collecting
cases), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 708
(7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed
self-defense will require an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close
fit between the government’s means and its end. Second, laws restricting activity
lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws that merely
regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens on the right may be more easily
justified. How much more easily depends on the relative severity of the burden and
its proximity to the core of the right.”).
79. Rational basis analysis places the burden on the challenger of a law to
prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 860 (2009).
80. Intermediate scrutiny analysis places the burden on the government to
show that the law is substantially related to an important governmental interest,
while strict scrutiny places the burden on the government to show that the law is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., id. at §§
861–62.
81. See, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706 (“Although the Supreme Court did not do so
in either Heller or McDonald, the Court did make it clear that the deferential
rational-basis standard is out, and with it the presumption of constitutionality.”).
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outside the home or only regulate the possession of firearms by
particular types of individuals. For example, laws regulating the
carrying of firearms outside of the home—probably the most
prominent issue in the courts since Heller—have received
intermediate scrutiny in three courts of appeals.82 Similarly, every
court of appeals that has reviewed the federal prohibition on
domestic violence misdemeanants possessing firearms has upheld
that law, applying some form of intermediate scrutiny.83 By contrast,
the few laws that have been subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis
(or some variation thereof) or that have been struck down using the
“scope only” approach have usually been complete bans on the
possession, sale, or use of firearms.84
IV. THE COMMON USE TEST APPLIED IN THE COURTS
Comparatively few courts have tackled the issue of what types of
weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. The courts that
have—usually in the context of lawsuits challenging bans on assault
weapons and large capacity magazines—hewed to the usual two-step
analysis in analyzing these laws. When applied to type-of-weapon
cases, the analysis usually asks (1) whether the type of weapon at
issue is protected by the Second Amendment and (2) (assuming the
first step found some level of protection) what level of scrutiny a ban
on the type of weapon at issue warrants.

82. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96–97; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876
(4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); Drake, 724 F.3d at 436. But see
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1173–79 (declining to apply intermediate scrutiny and invaliding
a discretionary concealed licensing law using the scope only approach); Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illinois’ complete ban on
carrying firearms outside the home and noting that “our analysis is not based on
degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of
any of the 50 states.”).
83. See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138; United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12,
25–26 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010).
84. See, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708–09 (requiring “a more rigorous showing
than [intermediate scrutiny] . . . , if not quite ‘strict scrutiny’’’ when reviewing a total
ban on firing ranges in the city of Chicago); Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of
Chi., 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 939–40 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying a standard of review
higher than intermediate scrutiny for a challenge to a Chicago ordinance banning
virtually all gun sales in the City); Palmer v. D.C., 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 182–83 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (finding that under any level of heightened scrutiny, the District of
Columbia’s virtual total ban on carrying firearms outside the home would violate the
Second Amendment).
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In working through this analysis, courts have largely followed a
familiar pattern. The first step of the two-step test is where courts
have usually most directly wrestled with the “common use” test. In
stark contrast to the often lengthy historical discussions that
typically come in the first step of Second Amendment analysis, the
application of the “common use” test by most courts has generally
involved only brief citation to statistical evidence offered by the
parties about the supposed prevalence of the weapons at issue. In
the second step, courts have taken a broader focus and looked at
such issues as the dangerousness of the banned weapons, and other
avenues available for self-defense. Although these issues would
naturally come up in the application of a level of scrutiny (i.e., to
show the government’s need for the ban), courts have actually used
these considerations frequently in selecting the appropriate level of
scrutiny (i.e., in determining how much the right is burdened).
Through this method, courts essentially end up determining the
scope of the right primarily in the second step rather than the first.
As demonstrated in the cases discussed below, courts’
unwillingness to deeply engage with the common use test and
tendency to either (A) rationalize their results through the second
step of the analysis or (B) ignore the common use test altogether
reflects the profound unworkability of the common use test and its
disconnection from the central right recognized in Heller. In only one
case did the court meaningfully engage in a deep look at the common
use test, and that analysis only serves to underscore the test’s
problems when taken to its logical conclusions.
A. Heller II & NYSRPA—Using the Second Step to Fix the First Step
In the most prominent case so far involving assault weapons and
large capacity ammunition magazines, Heller v. District of Columbia
(Heller II), the D.C. Circuit upheld the District of Columbia’s bans on
these items in the face of a Second Amendment challenge.85 In
determining whether the bans impinged on Second Amendment
rights, the court found it “clear enough in the record that semiautomatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are
indeed in ‘common use.’”86 To support this conclusion, the court cited
three statistics: (1) 1.6 million AR-15s have been manufactured since
1986; (2) in 2007, AR-15s accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms
and 14.4 percent of all rifles produced in the U.S. for the domestic
market; and (3) 18% of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were

85.
86.

Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1261.
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equipped with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and
approximately 4.7 million more such magazines were imported into
the United States between 1995 and 2000.87
The citation of these facts raises several questions about what
the common use test really means. Why is the manufacture of 1.6
million AR-15s since 1986 significant when there are over 300
million civilian firearms in circulation in the United States?88 How
can a firearm that represents less than half of one percent of all
firearms be considered in “common use”? Of course, the 1.6 million
figure is probably both over and under-inclusive for purposes of this
analysis since some AR-15s would not qualify as “assault weapons”
under Washington D.C.’s law89 and because there are other types of
assault weapons besides AR-15s.
As for the second manufacturing statistic, why is that relevant to
determining common use? Manufacturing does not necessarily
reflect whether a firearm will ultimately be sold. Moreover, why only
focus on the year 2007 (four years prior to the case being decided)
and why only on domestic manufacturing? Why is the percentage of
rifles specifically relevant? Is there some independent right to
possess commonly used rifles? Finally, even taking all of the figures
at face value, why is 5.5% or even 14.4% significant enough to
constitute common use? The magazine figures raise even more
questions. Why rely on such dated figures? Why rely solely on import
data when so many firearms are manufactured domestically? 90

87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Carlisle Moody, Heller, McDonald, and Murder:
Testing the More Guns = More Murder Thesis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1421, 1445
(2012); Blaire Briody & Maureen Mackey, 19 Unbelievable Facts About Guns in
America, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/unbelievable-facts-about-guns-in-america-2012-12.
89. The District of Columbia’s assault weapons ban, like many others, prohibits
semi-automatic rifles with one of a list of enumerated features. D.C. CODE § 72501.01(3A)(A)(i)(IV) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2015). Gun manufacturers have
responded to these bans by marketing “compliant” versions of popular guns,
including variants on the AR-15, that are different from the ordinary versions of
these guns only in the sense that they lack any of the banned features. See, e.g.,
M&P Rifles: State Complaint, SMITH & WESSON, http://www.smith-wesson.com
/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Category4_750001_750051_772659_-1_757784_757784_
image (last visited Dec. 25, 2015).
90. See JURGEN BRAUER, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, THE US FIREARMS INDUSTRY
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY 45 (2013), available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/
fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP14-US-Firearms-Industry.pdf (finding that
the number of firearms produced domestically was greater than the number of
firearms imported into the United States in every year from 1999 through 2010).
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The court did not answer any of these questions, but seemed to
implicitly recognize some of the difficulty with its assertion by noting
that “based upon the record as it stands [the court] cannot be certain
whether these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically
for self-defense or hunting and therefore whether the
prohibitions . . . meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear
arms.”91 This statement is also interesting in that the court appears
to conflate the distinction between a weapon simply being
“commonly used” and being useful for self-defense or hunting.
Obviously, these two things are very different because a weapon
could be useful for self-defense and be uncommon, or vice versa. The
court did not explore the issue further and declined to resolve the
question, instead assuming that the prohibitions did impinge on
Second Amendment rights and moving on to the next step of the
analysis: selecting an appropriate level of scrutiny.92
In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, the court relied,
in several ways, on the nature of the banned weapons and
magazines. The court noted that, unlike the law in Heller, the law
here did not prohibit the possession of “the quintessential selfdefense weapon, to wit, the handgun” and that the ban did not
prevent people from owning other “suitable and commonly used
weapon[s] for protection in the home,” such as long guns that lack
the prohibited features.93 Thus, the court found that while it could
not say whether the prohibitions impinged at all on a right protected
by the Second Amendment, it was reasonably certain that the bans
did not substantially burden that right.94 In support of this
argument, the court cited the same defensive gun use statistics
relied upon in Heller to show that most instances of defensive gun
use were accomplished with handguns.95 Accordingly, the court
found the appropriate standard of review was intermediate scrutiny
and went on to uphold the law as reasonably related to the District
of Columbia’s interest in public safety.
This application of the second step of the analysis is also
puzzling. The first step is supposed to be an identification of the
right at issue, with the second step simply asking how much the
right that is identified and described in the first step is burdened.
Because the court assumed in the first step that large capacity
ammunition magazines and assault weapons were protected by the
Second Amendment, the second step question—how much the right

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261.
Id.
Id. at 1261–62 (citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)).
Id. at 1261.
Id. (citing Kleck & Gertz, supra note 67, at 177, 185).
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identified in the first step is burdened—should have had an easy
answer: a lot, because those items are completely banned under the
District of Columbia’s laws. Such an answer probably would have led
to the application of strict scrutiny. Instead, the court’s supposed
inquiry into how much the bans burdened Second Amendment rights
more closely resembled what the first step is supposed to be—an
inquiry into whether the Second Amendment protects the conduct at
issue at all. In making that determination, the court was able to
dispense with the “common use” test and focus instead on other
questions about these weapons and magazines, such as how often
they are actually used in self-defense and whether alternative
“suitable and commonly used” weapons were still available for home
self-protection under the District of Columbia’s laws.96
After Heller II, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v.
Cuomo (NYSRPA),97 the Second Circuit upheld new laws in New
York and Connecticut banning assault weapons and large capacity
magazines. The laws were enacted in the wake of the Sandy Hook
Elementary School shooting.98 Like the court in Heller II, the Second
Circuit assumed that the guns and magazines at issue were
protected by the Second Amendment and, applying intermediate
scrutiny, upheld the bans.99

96. As the dissent pointed out, it is unclear why the argument that other kinds
of firearms are still legal is persuasive here when it was not persuasive in Heller
itself (where the government unsuccessfully attempted to rely on the continued
legality of long-guns). See id. at 1290 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). This further
suggests that the court was really arguing that these guns and magazines—unlike
the handguns in Heller—were outside the scope of the Second Amendment.
97. 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015).
98. Both laws added to existing prohibitions in those states. New York already
banned semi-automatic rifles with at least two “military-style” features, but its new
law expanded the definition of assault weapon to include semi-automatic rifles with
only one such feature. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d
349, 355–56 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015).
New York also previously banned large capacity ammunition magazines, but its new
law eliminated a “grandfather” clause that allowed New Yorkers to keep magazines
manufactured prior to 1994. Id. at 356–57. Connecticut also moved from a “two
feature” to a “one feature” test for its assault weapons ban but its restriction on large
capacity ammunition magazines was new. See Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234,
240–41 & n.19 (D. Conn. 2014) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015).
99. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 257, 260–64. The court struck down a separate
provision that required magazines to only be loaded with no more than seven
cartridges at one time, except when at a shooting range. Id. at 264. The court found
that the state had failed to sufficiently justify the load limit since ten round
magazines would remain in circulation under the laws, making the load limit
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In NYSRPA, the court broke the “scope of the right” portion of its
analysis into two parts—whether the guns and magazines were in
common use and whether they were “typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes.”100 In analyzing common use,
the court reviewed more evidence about common use than in Heller
II, likely because of the development on both sides of better research
into the issue in the years after Heller II. In addition to the data
relied on by the Heller II court in NYSRPA had before it
manufacturing data about the number of AR-15 type rifles
manufactured for the domestic market,101 the percentage of firearm
sales AR-15s accounted for in 2011, the fact that many popular
firearms are designed for use with large capacity ammunition
magazines, the fact that one study estimated that there were one
million privately owned assault weapons in the United States in
1990, and the fact that as of 2000, nearly 50 million large capacity
ammunition magazines had been approved for import into the
United States.102 The court also considered evidence offered by the
plaintiffs that a plurality of responders to an online survey of owners
of AR-15 type guns indicated that they only owned one such weapon,
which the plaintiffs argued indicated widespread ownership.103 The
defendants countered with an estimate finding assault weapons only
account for roughly 2% of all guns owned in the United States.104

unlikely to have much practical impact. See id. This is noteworthy because it appears
to be the closest a court has come, since Heller, to striking down a “type of weapon”
restriction on Second Amendment grounds; although, this restriction was really on
behavior (loading extra rounds) not on the type of equipment a person could possess.
The court also held Connecticut’s specific ban on the Remington Tactical Rifle Model
7615, a pump-action (not semi-automatic) rifle, unconstitutional because of the
state’s failure to present arguments defending its constitutionality on appeal. Id. at
250 n.17, 257 n.73, 262 n.112, 265.
100. Id. at 254–55.
101. Id. at 255. Interestingly, the number the court relied upon came from a
declaration offered by the plaintiffs saying that 3.97 million AR-15 type rifles had
been manufactured since 1986. Shew, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 245 & nn.40–41; NYSRPA,
990 F. Supp. 2d at 364. While this appears to conflict with the statement in Heller II
that only 1.6 million AR-15s had been manufactured since 1986, the discrepancy is
probably explained by the NYSRPA declaration’s broader focus on all “AR-15 type
rifles.” See NYSRPA, 990 F. Supp. 2d, at 364 (emphasis added) (“Though the mark
‘AR-15’ is Colt’s, many manufacturers make a similar firearm.”).
102. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255; Shew, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46 & nn.40–
41; NYSRPA, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 364–65.
103. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255; Joint Appendix at 155–64, New York State Rifle
& Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-0036).
104. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255.
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Just like in Heller II, the citation to this evidence raised many of
the same puzzling questions about the common use test and how the
Second Circuit was applying it. The court did not make much of an
effort to address these questions directly. The NYSRPA court simply
concluded—after reciting some of the statistics above—that the
banned weapons were in common use because millions of them exist
in the United States even according to “the most conservative
estimates cited by the parties.”105 The court did not explain why
possession by a few million Americans was sufficient to qualify as
“common use.” Nor did either court explain which of the statistics
offered were relevant to the common use test and which were not (or
which had the most weight).
The court was less sure of itself in looking at the second part of
the scope inquiry—whether the weapons were “typically possessed”
for lawful purposes—and followed the path of Heller II by assuming
without deciding that the weapons were typically possessed for such
purposes.106 Thus, the court assumed that the bans did prohibit
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment.107
After making that assumption, the court went on to find that
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply to the
bans. The court largely tracked the reasoning in Heller II, finding
that the law did not warrant strict scrutiny because it did not
“effectively disarm” individuals or prohibit an “entire class of arms”
because other protected arms, including semi-automatic weapons
without prohibited features, were still available.108 Interestingly, the
court suggested another reason for applying intermediate scrutiny
was that the weapons prohibited by these laws were not as popular
as the handguns at issue in Heller.109 Applying intermediate
scrutiny, the court upheld the bans based on the public safety
justifications offered by Connecticut and New York.110
The application of intermediate scrutiny in NYSRPA is puzzling
for the same reasons it was in Heller II. After the courts found (or
assumed) that the laws at issue completely banned weapons that are
protected by the Second Amendment, it should have been an easy
decision to apply strict scrutiny. The choice to apply intermediate
scrutiny instead seems motivated by some doubt on the part of the

105. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255–56.
106. Id. at 256–58.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 258–61 (citing Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C.
Cir. 2011)).
109. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 260 n.98.
110. Id. at 261–64.
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court that the weapons at issue should receive Second Amendment
protection at all. If these courts really believed that assault weapons
and large capacity ammunition magazines were protected, then
these cases should not have been unlike Heller itself where one
commonly used type of arm (handguns) was completely banned
while another type (long guns) remained legal.111
The fairly deferential intermediate scrutiny that was applied to
the laws in NYSRPA and Heller II that considered available selfdefense alternatives can only be harmonized with the much harsher
treatment the law received in Heller by some difference in the
weapons at issue. In order to reconcile this disparate treatment,
something about the assault weapons and large capacity
ammunition magazines in the former cases would, in the eyes of
courts, have to make them less worthy of protection than the
handguns in the latter. The courts do not say what this is,112 but I
think it reflects these courts’ serious misgivings about whether they
were applying the common use test correctly in finding these
weapons protected in the first place,113 given all the questions about
the test that were left unanswered in Heller, the lack of reliable data
on the market share of different types of firearms, and, perhaps,
underlying disagreement with the common use test itself.
B. James & Kampfer — Ignoring the Common Use Test and
Replacing it with Danger Prevention and Alternative Means Analysis
Other courts have been more obvious in their reluctance to apply
the common use test. In People v. James,114 the California Court of
Appeal rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the state’s ban on

111. See supra Part III.A.2.
112. Though Heller II does compare the frequency with which assault weapons
are used defensively to the frequency of defensive handgun use. See Heller II, 670
F.3d at 1262.
113. This is reflected in the NYSRPA court’s argument that bans on assault
weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines are not deserving of strict
scrutiny because those weapons are less popular than handguns. See NYSRPA, 804
F.3d at 260 n.98. At least one court has looked at much of the same evidence as
Heller II and NYSRPA and expressed “serious[] doubts” about whether assault
weapons are protected by the Second Amendment at all. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F.
Supp. 3d 768, 788–89 (D. Md. 2014) (“[A]ssault weapons represent no more than 3%
of the current civilian gun stock, and ownership of those weapons is highly
concentrated in less than 1% of the U.S. population.”). However, that court still
applied a similar mode of analysis to Heller II and NYSRPA because it assumed that
the banned weapons were protected by the Second Amendment and upheld the ban
under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 789–91, 793 n.33, 797.
114. 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
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assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles (rifles capable of utilizing
particularly large and destructive cartridges).115 The court dispensed
with the case by finding that the bans simply did not prohibit
firearms that were protected by the Second Amendment.116
While the court paid lip service to the “common use” test,117 its
analysis essentially ignored it. Instead, the court described some of
the dangerous features of these guns that the legislature was
concerned about when it enacted the bans, including the high rate of
fire of assault weapons and the capability of a .50 caliber rifle to
destroy or damage buildings and vehicles.118 From those facts, the
court concluded that “[t]hese are not the types of weapons typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as sport
hunting or self-defense; rather, these are weapons of war. . . ” and
thus “fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons
that the government can prohibit for individual use.”119
While the evidence before the California Legislature and the
James court may have shown that these weapons were dangerous, it
had no bearing on whether these weapons were also unusual (i.e.,
not in common use). Surely, a weapon could be both very dangerous
and in common use. The James court elided that distinction by
focusing on the question of dangerousness and ignoring the question
of unusualness completely.
Similarly, in Kampfer v. Cuomo,120 another challenge to New
York’s post–Newtown assault weapons ban, the federal district court
did not even mention the common use test.121 Instead, in the first
step of its analysis, the court focused entirely on whether alternative
arms remained available for self-defense, arguing that “any burden
upon the possession of an ‘assault weapon’ is relevant only insofar as
it generally impacts one’s ability to possess arms.”122 Because the

115. A cartridge is a metallic package containing “a bullet, case, powder, and
primer,” in simpler terms, a bullet and propellant. See, e.g., VIN SPARANO,
Cartridges, in THE COMPLETE OUTDOORS ENCYCLOPEDIA, 36, 36–37 (St. Martin’s
Griffin rev. ed. 2000).
116. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 586.
117. Id. at 585 (describing the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller as
“the right to possess and carry weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes such as self-defense”) (citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–30
(2008)).
118. Id. at 585–86.
119. Id. at 586.
120. 993 F. Supp. 2d 188 (N.D.N.Y. 2014).
121. Unlike the plaintiffs in NYSRPA, the plaintiff in Kampfer did not challenge
New York’s ban on large capacity ammunition magazines. See id. at 193 n.6.
122. Id. at 195 n.10.
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court found that “ample firearms remain[ed] available to carry out
the ‘central component’ of the Second Amendment right[,] selfdefense,” the court held that New York’s assault weapons ban did
not impose a substantial burden on Second Amendment rights and
essentially ended its analysis there.123
While James and Kampfer’s explicit replacement of the common
use test with different inquiries about dangerousness and
alternative means is probably not consistent with Heller, their
shirking of the common use test at least has the virtue of being more
transparent than the sleight of hand pulled off by the courts in
Heller II and NYSRPA. The courts in both of the former cases put
the question of whether the weapons were covered by the Second
Amendment squarely where it logically belongs, in the first part of
the two-step analysis.124 In doing so, these courts made explicit what
was implicit in the Heller II type cases: Assault weapons should not
qualify for Second Amendment protection.
Nevertheless, these cases are still unsatisfying in that they fail
to provide any explanation for why they depart from the common use
inquiry. Moreover, the alternative tests those courts utilize present
pose problems of their own. In the case of a pure dangerousness test,
it seems unlikely that the law in Heller itself would have been struck
down under such a test because handguns are used very commonly
by criminals and have proven to be quite dangerous.125 Similarly, a
test centered only on alternative means also suggests a different
outcome in Heller since long guns remained available under the
District’s handgun ban.126 More broadly, even a ban on all firearms
might survive such a test since other arms, such as knives and
tasers, might remain available.127

123. See id. at 196 (quoting D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)).
124. See, e.g., James, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 676–77. James was decided prior to
the two-step test becoming widely used and did not explicitly mention such a test,
but its analysis clearly reflects the kind of “scope of the right” inquiry that is now the
hallmark of the first step of that test.
125. See Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that “semi-automatic handguns are more
dangerous as a class than semi-automatic rifles because handguns can be concealed
. . . .” and that handguns ‘are the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed
criminals.’”).
126. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
127. See David B. Kopel et al., Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 167, 191–99 (2013); Ron F. Wright, Note, Shocking the Second
Amendment: Invalidating States’ Prohibitions on Taser with the District of Columbia
v. Heller, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 159, 176 (2010).
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C. Fyock—Engaging With The Common Use Test
One characteristic all the cases discussed above share is that
they fail to meaningfully engage with questions about what the
common use test really means. An exception to this trend is Fyock v.
City of Sunnyvale,128 which was a case from the Northern District of
California dealing with a Second Amendment challenge to a
California city’s ordinance prohibiting the possession of large
capacity ammunition magazines.129 Although the court ultimately
denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction enjoining
the law, the court did find that large capacity ammunition
magazines were in common use and therefore protected by the
Second Amendment.130 Along the way, the court raised and
answered some interesting questions about how it was applying the
common use test.
Like the courts in Heller II and similar cases, the court cited
statistical evidence offered by the plaintiffs that large capacity
magazines are commonly owned, including a declaration alleging
that large capacity ammunition magazines make up approximately
47% of all magazines owned nationwide and evidence showing that
many of the semi-automatic rifles and handguns currently for sale to
consumers are sold with large capacity ammunition magazines.131
However, the court also noted that “[b]oth parties admit[ted] that
reliable data on the number of the banned magazines owned by
individuals does not exist.”132 The court nevertheless found it “safe to
say that whatever the actual number of such magazines in United
States consumers’ hands is, it is in the tens-of-millions, even under
the most conservative estimates.”133
The defendants argued that the court should apply a local test
and conclude that such magazines could not be in common use in
California because their sale (though not their possession) had been
banned in California—through a combination of state and federal
laws—since 1994.134 The court rejected that argument because the
“Supreme Court [in Heller] did not define the common use test as a
local test, but rather evaluated common use as a national
test . . . .”135 The court further asserted that any local test would not

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

25 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
See id. at 1272–73.
See id. at 1275–77.
See id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1275–76.
Id. Although Heller referred to handguns as “the most preferred firearm in
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make sense because it would lead to the scope of individuals’ Second
Amendment rights varying based on location, which would not be
consistent with safeguarding individual rights equally throughout
the United States.136
The court also rejected an argument that even if large capacity
ammunition magazines are commonly owned, they are not
commonly used for self-defense.137 The court found—in a departure
from the apparent view of the court in Heller II—that under the
common use test, “the standard is [solely] whether the [weapons at
issue] are ‘typically possessed by law abiding citizens for lawful
purposes,’ not whether the [weapons] are often used for selfdefense.”138 The court explained that most people never need to
discharge a firearm in self-defense at all, but that this fact “should
be celebrated” rather than used as a basis to limit the protections of
the Second Amendment.139 Thus, the court found that large capacity
ammunition magazines were protected by the Second
Amendment.140
However, like the courts that employ the Heller II style
methodology, the court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the
appropriate standard to apply to the ban largely because of the
availability of alternative weapons.141 The court observed that
“[m]agazines having a capacity to accept more than ten rounds are
hardly crucial for citizens to exercise their right to bear arms.”142
Rather, “[i]ndividuals have countless other handgun and magazine
options to exercise their Second Amendment rights.”143 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the ban only imposed a “light” burden on

the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,” the Court did
not explicitly describe the common use test as a national standard. See D.C. v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (emphasis added).
136. See Fyock, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1276. But see Joseph Blocher, Firearm
Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 124–32 (2013) (noting the prevalence of local variation in
the enforcement of constitutional rights in other areas and suggesting that such
variation may be particularly desirable in Second Amendment analysis).
137. See Fyock, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1276.
138. See id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1277. The court also rejected an argument that magazines are not
arms at all. See id. at 1276. The court found ammunition magazines must be
protected by the Second Amendment because they are “integral components to vast
categories of guns.” Id.
141. See id. at 1278–79.
142. Id. at 1278.
143. Id.
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Second Amendment rights and applied intermediate scrutiny to
uphold the ban based on its connection to preserving public safety.144
The court’s analysis in Fyock takes the common use test to its
logical conclusion: Any weapon that is sufficiently popular with the
public (on a nationwide basis) is subject to Second Amendment
protection, regardless of the weapon’s usefulness or necessity for
adequate self-defense.145 While the court was more honest than
other courts about the true meaning of the common use test, the
court’s choice to apply an alternative means analysis in the second
step of its reasoning shows that it was just as eager to blunt the
impact of the common use test as other courts.146
As described in the following section, courts’ reluctance to apply
the common use test forthrightly is a reflection of the test’s
unworkable nature, tendency to create undesirable incentives, and
inadequacy to protect the Second Amendment right recognized in
Heller.
V. THE COMMON USE TEST’S FLAWS & THE REASONABLE SELFDEFENSE APPROACH
As the discussion above demonstrates, courts have had a difficult
time applying the common use test in a coherent and intellectually
honest way. In this section, I will demonstrate why those difficulties
are not caused by the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately explain
the test, but instead reflect fundamental problems with the test
itself. Next, I will outline some of the alternatives to the common use
test proposed in recent scholarship and explain why they are
unpersuasive. Finally, I will propose my own test for analyzing typeof-weapon claims: Whether the weapon at issue is consistent with
reasonable self-defense.
A. The Problems with The Common Use Test
While Heller left many questions unanswered about the common
use test, the lower courts’ subsequent applications of the test,
particularly in the Fyock decision, provide a reasonably clear picture
of what the common use test actually requires. Moreover, unlike the
courts, legal scholars have more willingly engaged in detailed
applications of the common use test to particular weapons.147 These

144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 1278–79.
See id. at 1277.
See id. at 1278.
See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 127, at 191–96 (arguing that knives are
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articles elucidate further what Fyock, and, to a less explicit extent,
Heller II and similar cases suggest: The common use test is a mere
gauge of the current total ownership in the United States of the
weapon at issue.
The common use test essentially asks courts to look at evidence
about the number of the particular firearm or firearm accessory148 at
issue owned by private citizens149 in the United States for lawful
purposes such as self-defense150 at the time the case is decided. As
discussed above, in Heller II, NYSRPA, and Fyock, the courts relied
on evidence that usually was offered as indirect proof of those
numbers, such as manufacturing and sales statistics.151 From this
data, courts make a determination about whether the guns or gun
accessories are sufficiently popular to warrant protection, usually
finding such protection when the number of weapons in private
hands reaches into the “tens-of-millions” range.152

protected by the Second Amendment); Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic)
Arms, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 755, 770–73 (2013) (admitting that robotic arms
probably do not qualify for protection under the common use test today but arguing
that they will “edge toward” qualifying for protection in the future, assuming they
are not banned); Lindsay Colvin, Note, History, Heller, and High-Capacity
Magazines: What Is the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment
Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1069 (2014) (arguing that large capacity
ammunition magazines qualify for protection under the common use test); Peter
Jensen-Haxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the
Right to Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447,
485–93 (2012) (discussing the potential application of the common use test to
weapons manufactured using 3D printing technology); Wright, supra note 127, at
181–89 (arguing that tasers qualify for protection under the common use test).
148. There has been some discussion about the level of generality to be applied
in determining whether a particular weapon is in common use. See, e.g., Volokh,
supra note 24, at 1479 (“How common a weapon is depends on how specifically it is
defined. Handguns are in common use, but particular brands of handguns are less
common, and some are uncommon, simply because they come from small companies
or are of unusual caliber or design.”); Jensen-Haxel, supra note 147, at 486–88, 487
n.257.
149. See Colvin, supra note 147, at 1050–51 (“The Court [in Heller] rejected the
notion that the common user includes military organizations . . . .”).
150. Most courts have analyzed the lawful use factor separately. A notable
exception is NYSRPA and that court ultimately had to just assume this factor was
present because of a lack of reliable data on the uses of the weapons at issue. See
NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256–57.
151. See discussion supra Part IV.
152. See, e.g., Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1275 (N.D. Cal.
2014). This is one area that the courts and subsequent scholarship have not filled in
about the common use test—the exact quantum of popularity required for a weapon
to enter common use. However, I maintain that no matter how this or any other gap
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This test has at least five critical flaws. First, it gives the
government the ability to essentially freeze the right where it now
stands by preventing new firearms from becoming popular and
therefore protected (the under-protection problem). Second, it gives
the firearm industry the ability to unilaterally make new firearms
protected simply by manufacturing and heavily marketing them (the
overprotection problem). Third, while the idea of linking the scope of
the right to the choice of the people is superficially appealing, the
advantages of doing so are lessened in this context, especially since
the test does not necessarily even reflect what it purports to reflect—
the average person’s firearm of choice (the public choice fallacy).
Fourth, reliable data on which firearms are possessed most
commonly by Americans does not exist and is not likely to exist in
the future (the data problem). Fifth, the test is not commanded by
the text or history of the Second Amendment; instead, it is simply
the result of a poor attempt to harmonize Heller’s holding with other
precedent (the doctrinal problem).
1. The Under-Protection Problem
As many have pointed out, the common use test creates an
incentive for governments that are interested in restricting access to
firearms to ban new weapons completely before they can become
popular.153 If a new firearm that is extremely effective for selfdefense is invented, and Congress immediately bans its use
nationwide, it could never become commonly possessed for selfdefense simply because Congress decided to ban it.154 Even more

in the test is filled in, the test will remain fatally flawed. See discussion infra
subsections V.A.1–4.
153. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1393 (2009) (“Justice Scalia’s test empowers Congress to create
its own exceptions to the Second Amendment so long as the Supreme Court waits
awhile before it checks to see whether particular weapons are in common civilian
use.”); Terzian, supra note 147, at 770 & n.114 (collecting sources); Colvin, supra
note 147, at 1051; Wright, supra note 127, at 181 n.131; see also D.C. v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 721 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“On the majority’s reasoning, if
tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense
weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes
popular Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In
essence, the majority determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see
what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for believing that the Framers
intended such circular reasoning.”).
154. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 721.
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troubling, consider the hypothetical proposed by Professors Craig
Lerner and Nelson Lund:
Suppose, for example, that the federal handgun ban imposed
in the District of Columbia in 1976 had been applied by
Congress to the entire nation that same year. If a case
challenging the ban had not reached the Supreme Court until
2008, it would presumably have been upheld under the
[common use] test . . . . 155
Could it be that the outcome of a case that is often used as the
gold standard of the originalist interpretive methodology156 turned,
not on the original understanding of the constitutional text in 1791,
but on a policy decision made by Congress in the last few decades?
That is exactly the direction in which the common use test points.
For obvious reasons, it is very troubling to give Congress the
power to control the scope of the right guaranteed by the Second
Amendment or any other enumerated constitutional right. The Bill
of Rights in general, and the Second Amendment, in particular, are
supposed to act as restraints on the power of Congress in order to
protect individual liberty. Indeed, in an oft quoted passage from
Heller, the majority declares that “[c]onstitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even
future judges think that scope too broad.”157 But under the common
use test, future Congresses have quite a bit of power to control the
scope of the right.

155. Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1393. Another article provides a more
futuristic hypothetical illustrating the problem:
Suppose a new weapon is designed that emits a laser beam and is
absolutely non-lethal. A legislature could immediately and completely ban
the weapon before it reaches the masses and would theoretically be
permissible to do so under Heller. While the firearms of Heller have been
circulating in the public for centuries, our hypothetical laser weapon would
never have a chance to become ‘common’ enough to [satisfy the common use
test] . . . .
Wright, supra note 127, at 181 n.131.
156. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It
Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest
example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted
by the Supreme Court.”).
157. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
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Moreover, because courts have interpreted the common use test
(probably correctly)158 to be a question about national common use
as opposed to state-wide or local common use,159 the test places this
power to define the scope of the arms protected by the Second
Amendment solely in the hands of the federal government rather
than state or local governments. If granting such power to the
government were proper at all, it would make little sense to give it to
the federal government but not to state governments, particularly
given state (and local) governments’ traditional leading roles in
setting firearms policy.160 This dichotomy also undermines the idea,
which is repeated throughout McDonald, that the Second
Amendment right—like others in the Bill of Rights—should apply to
the states with the same strength as it applies to the federal
government, rather than in a less strong, “watered-down” form.161
The common use test turns this concern on its head, applying a
watered down version of the Second Amendment to the federal
government and a stronger version to the states.
Finally, giving any government this power creates an incentive
for ineffective regulation of firearms and makes compromise less
likely in the gun debate. It would be rational under this test for
policy makers favoring stronger gun control laws to push
aggressively for outright bans of new firearms and to be less inclined
to consider alternative forms of regulation. This is because if sales of
a new firearm are allowed and it becomes popular enough to gain
constitutional protection, then any regulations on that firearm could
become jeopardized. Making the battle over each new weapon an “all
or nothing” fight will lead policymakers away from careful
individualized consideration of each weapon, which all sides would
likely agree is not a smart way to making gun policy.
2. The Over-Protection Problem
A similar problem that has gotten much less attention is that the
common use test leads to the protection of guns that really should
not be protected (or at least could lead to them being protected for
the wrong reasons). The test does this by putting a great deal of

158. After all, as Lerner & Lund’s hypothetical demonstrates, a local test would
probably have resulted in Heller itself coming out differently. See Lerner & Lund,
supra note 153, at 1393.
159. See discussion of Fyock, supra Section IV.C.
160. See Blocher, supra note 136, at 107–121 (describing “urban gun control” as
a “nationwide phenomenon” in the founding era and the following century and noting
that the first major federal gun control law was not enacted until the 1930s).
161. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010).
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power into the hands of gun manufacturers and more pro-gun states.
It also may hinder efforts to require consumer safety features on
guns.
As the story of the exploding popularity of assault weapons
discussed in Section II.A, supra, demonstrates, the gun industry has
the ability to flood the market with new, deadlier weapons in a very
short time frame. The common use test will give the industry even
more incentive to do just that. By quickly bringing new weapons into
popularity, the industry will not only be making significant current
profits but will also be constitutionally guaranteeing future profits.
This is particularly true since, as demonstrated in many of the cases
above, courts often rely on mere manufacturing data in determining
common use rather than sales data, which is more difficult to
ascertain. Thus, manufacturers can contribute to a weapon’s
constitutional protection simply by making a lot of them—whether
or not they immediately become popular with consumers.
The common use test also increases the power of legislators in
more pro-gun states to control what becomes constitutionally
protected. The use of a national common use test means that a
weapon that becomes very popular in just a handful of populous
states can become constitutionally protected in all of the states.
Thus, while state governments may not have the federal
government’s power to prevent arms from becoming protected under
the common use test, a handful of pro-gun states with high enough
populations could have the ability to bring a gun type into common
use simply by allowing that type of gun to be sold even if most other
states do not. There is no justification for giving states that favor
less restrictive gun laws such unilateral power.
State efforts to require safety improvements to firearms could
also be stunted by the common use test. Although there are no
federal design safety standards for firearms, several states have
enacted laws setting such standards in order to promote safer
designs—particularly of handguns—to prevent accidents.162 For
example, California’s law requires semi-automatic handguns that
were approved for sale in California after a certain date to include a

162. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16380, 16900, 17140, 31900–32110 (West 2012 &
Supp. 2015); D.C. CODE § 7-2505.04 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-15(a) (1993); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-3(A)(h) (West Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY,
§§ 5-405–406 (LexisNexis 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§ 123, 131½, 131¾
(West 2002 & Supp. 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.712, 624.716 (West 2009 &
Supp. 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(12-a) (McKinney Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 11, §§ 4047–4074 (2011); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 2323 (2013); 501 MASS.
CODE REGS. §§ 7.01–.16 (2007); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 16.01–.09 (1999); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 482.1–.7 (1980).
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“chamber load indicator,”163 which is a device that provides a clear
indication on a gun when a round is in the firing chamber.164 A more
ambitious law in New Jersey will require all handguns that are sold
after a certain date to be equipped with “smart gun” or “owner
authorization” technology that allows the gun only to be fired by its
authorized owner, once such technology is available.165
The purpose of these laws is to drive changes in existing firearm
models. In order to do that, these laws necessarily prohibit (or cause
to be phased out over time) the sale of firearms that do not comply
with these safety standards. In doing so, the laws may ban the sale
of firearms that are currently in common use because many people
in the nation will still possess firearms without the features
promoted by the laws. This concern is not hypothetical; at least one
lawsuit predicated on this exact argument is currently challenging
California’s handgun safety standards.166
Whether implementing certain safety standards for firearms
somehow diminishes citizens’ ability to defend themselves is
debatable, but that debate is not the one the common use test will
require. Instead, the test simply asks whether the law bans firearms
that are currently most commonly possessed, a test that laws setting
new safety standards are, by definition, likely to fail.167 After all, if
guns with a particular safety feature were already the norm, there
would be much less of a need for regulatory intervention.

163. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31910(b)(4) (West 2012).
164. See SPORTING ARMS AND AMMUNITION MFRS.’ INST., Owner Recognition
Technology, in BACKGROUND PAPER #9, 1, 3–4, http://www.saami.org/specifications_
and_information/publications/download/SAAMI_ITEM_229Owner_Recognition_Technology.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
165. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1dd, 2C:58-2a(5)(e), -2.3, -2.4; (West 2005 &
Sup. 2015).
166. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of
Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 14, 19–20, Pena v. Lindley, No. 2:09-cv01185, 2015 WL 854684 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2015) (arguing that California’s handgun
safety standards result in a ban on the sale of “handguns of the kind in common use
protected by the Second Amendment.”).
167. Of course, that is not to say that challenges to these laws are necessarily
guaranteed to succeed. Depending on the level of generality one uses to define
firearms in common use, it may be that such laws do not ban firearms in common
use after all (i.e., it does not matter whether handguns with feature X are common; it
only matters that handguns generally are common, and since handguns are allowed
under the laws, even if they must have feature X, the law does not ban a weapon in
common use). Moreover, even if a court does find that the banned firearms are in
common use, such laws could still survive at the second step of the analysis by
satisfying the appropriate level of scrutiny.
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3. The Public Choice Fallacy
One of the alleged virtues of the common use test is that it
supposedly reflects consumer choice and thus allows Americans, as a
whole, to exercise the Second Amendment right in the way they
decide is best.168 Superficially, this is an advantage the common use
test shares with the test the Court established in Kyllo v. United
States169 for determining whether the government’s use of a
particular technology constituted a search by looking at whether the
technology the government used was in general public use.170
However, the advantage is lessened by the difference between the
two rights. The Fourth Amendment’s underlying concern is privacy,
while the Second Amendment’s underlying concern is physical
safety. Unlike physical safety, privacy is a concept that is directly
tied to the popular mores of the day.171 Thus, while a test based on
the popularity of a particular technology might make sense in the
Fourth Amendment context, it is less appropriate in the Second
Amendment context.
However, even taking the goal of reflecting public sentiment at
face value, the common use test fails to accomplish this goal. For the
reasons stated above, governments and firearm manufacturers
actually have at least as much, if not more control than average
Americans over which weapons end up in common use. But even
setting those concerns aside, the common use test, at least as it has
been applied by the courts so far, fails to actually reflect the selfdefense choices of most Americans.
The problem is, as demonstrated in the cases above, in
determining common use, courts tend to rely on the raw number of
weapons that are in private hands without putting those numbers

168. See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 147, at 471 (“[I]ndividual autonomy, as with
many fundamental rights, may be an important consideration in defining the scope
of protection.”); Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of
Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 386 (2009) (“That hundreds of
thousands, indeed millions of individuals choose a particular means of participating
in constitutionally protected conduct is powerful prima facie evidence that the chosen
means is itself deserving of protection. In other constitutional contexts, wide
deference is given to individuals’ chosen means for exercising a constitutional right—
even if most judges and other elites might find the people’s choice as unseemly and
ill-adapted as, say, the decision to engage in political protest by wearing a jacket that
reads ‘Fuck the Draft.’”).
169. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (Scalia, J.).
170. See id. at 40.
171. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”).
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into any context. But context is quite important. For example, in
analyzing assault weapons bans, some courts have highlighted the
fact that several million AR-15 type rifles have been manufactured
over the last few decades.172 Even assuming that manufacturing
statistics necessarily reflect ownership173 and that several million is
enough to constitute common use, this statistic still fails to
demonstrate that AR-15 type rifles are really commonly chosen for
self-defense. That is because this statistic fails to account for the fact
that some people, probably a great number, own more than one AR15 style rifle.174 Thus, these statistics do not reflect any widespread
popularity of the AR-15 style rifle, but rather reflect these weapons’
popularity with a relatively small number of people building
personal arsenals.175
This is a problem that is likely to arise with respect to many
categories of firearms because gun ownership is becoming more
concentrated in the United States.176 One 2004 study found that 20%
of the nation’s gun owners own 65% of the nation’s guns.177 It is
likely that this concentration has only increased since then as more
recent surveys have found a drop in the percentage of Americans
who say they own any guns178 despite record numbers of background
checks being processed by the federal government.179
This concentrated ownership gives courts a skewed picture of
which guns are in common use. By simply looking at raw numbers,
courts will extend the Second Amendment’s protection to new

172. See discussion of NYSRPA and Heller II, supra Section IV.A.
173. A potentially dubious assumption for the reasons discussed in the next
subsection.
174. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, F. Supp. 3d 768, 786 & n.23 (D. Md. 2014) (citing
declaration testimony indicating that the average owner of an AR or AK platform
rifle owns 3.1 such weapons).
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., id.
177. See Allison Brennan, Analysis: Fewer U.S. Gun Owners Own More Guns,
CNN (July 31, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/31/politics/gunownership-declining/.
178. This also highlights a potential under-protection problem. If the decline in
gun ownership rates continues, even if the remaining gun owners own many guns,
there could come a point at which no guns are in common use. At that point, under
the common use test, the government would theoretically be able to ban all guns.
179. See Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Share of Homes with Guns Shows
4-Decade Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/us/
rate-of-gun-ownership-is-down-survey-shows.html (noting that according to a 2012
survey, only 34% of Americans reported having a gun in their home, a historic low,
but also noting that the number of background checks has “surged” since the late
1990s).
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weapons based on the preferences of a shrinking number of gun
enthusiasts. This greatly diminishes the common use test’s supposed
value as a reflection of Americans’—or even gun owners’—collective
self-defense preferences.
4. The Data Problem
A practical problem with the common use test is that the data on
firearm ownership necessary to evaluate whether the test is satisfied
in any given case simply does not exist. The United States has no
national registry recording firearm ownership, nor do most states
have such registries.180 For that reason, courts have been forced to
rely on secondary indicators of firearm ownership, most commonly
production and import data, sales data, and survey data.181 Each of
these sources is inadequate and potentially problematic.
Production and import data presents the obvious problem that it
does not necessarily reflect which guns were actually sold. Of course,
a smart company is unlikely to continue manufacturing or importing
a type of gun that is not selling well, but an adjustment in
manufacturing or imports would likely be a lagging indicator of any
decline or rise in the popularity of a weapon among consumers. A
related problem is that manufacturing and import data will reflect
what companies think consumers want to buy now or perhaps in the
next few months or years, not what they already own. This will lead
courts to overestimate the popularity of more “contemporary” guns
while underestimating the popularity of guns that may indeed be
widely owned but were bought a long time ago and are not widely in
demand today.

180. See Registration of Firearms Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE (Oct. 1, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/registration-of-firearms-policysummary/ (noting that only Hawaii and the District of Columbia require the
registration of all firearms). The federal government does require the registration of
machine guns. Id. A few states maintain records of some firearm transfers that could
be used as a basis to estimate ownership, but since those records are primarily kept
for the purpose of tracking the transfers rather than ownership, they would likely be
of limited utility. See Kolbe, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 784 n.21 (“Since 1994, Maryland has
gathered information regarding the transfer of regulated firearms. It is important to
note, however, that all transfers were recorded, even if the transfer was of a firearm
previously transferred. . . . In this way, the information collected by Maryland may
overstate the number of regulated firearms.”) (citations omitted).
181. See, e.g., Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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More fundamentally, manufacturing data is unlikely to provide
enough specific information to be of use to courts because “firearms
manufacturers generally don’t break down their production statistics
by model.”182 Perhaps for competitive reasons, gun manufacturers
simply do not publicly release data at the fine level of detail that
would be necessary to draw conclusions in cases challenging laws
that target very specific firearm characteristics. For this reason,
manufacturing data (and probably import data) will seldom be of
much use in applying the common use test.
Sales data also is not likely to be a good barometer of common
use. Like manufacturing data, it suffers from the problem of only
reflecting consumers’ current choices, rather than the types of guns
consumers may have purchased many years ago. Sales data is also
elusive because information submitted to the federal government to
obtain background checks does not include any information on the
specific type of firearm the purchaser attempted to buy.183 Moreover,
even if such records were kept in connection with background
checks, a significant portion of firearm transfers are conducted
without background checks at all through so-called “private”
transfers (transfers that do not involve a federally licensed firearms
dealer).184 When it comes to the sale of ammunition and other
accessories, no background checks are conducted at all in most
states.

182. See Peters, supra note 22.
183. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(1) (2009) (listing the types of information logged for
each criminal background check conducted). Even the data that is collected in order
to conduct these checks must be erased within twenty-four hours if the purchase is
approved. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(1)(iii) (2009). However, the federal government
does keep data on the raw number of background checks conducted by state and by
date. See FBI, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS)
Operations
2013
(2013),
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2013operations-report.
184. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on
Private Ownership and Use of Firearms, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.: RES. IN BRIEF 6–7
(1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf. The exact percentage
of transfers conducted without background checks has been the subject of some
dispute in recent years in the debate over whether to expand the background check
requirement to private transfers. See Glenn Kessler, Obama’s continued use of the
claim that 40 percent of gun sales lack background checks, WASH. POST: FACT
CHECKER (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/
obamas-continued-use-of-the-claim-that-40-percent-of-gun-sales-lack-backgroundchecks/2013/04/01/002e06ce-9b0f-11e2-a941-a19bce7af755_blog.html. However, the
basic point for my purposes, whether the number is as high as 40% or as low as 10%,
is that such checks do not cover some sizeable portion of firearm transfers in the
United States.
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For these reasons, the only sales data available is the data that
is voluntarily released by firearms retailers. Such data is likely to be
lacking both in its level of detail about the specific weapon types
purchased and in completeness because of the large number of
firearms dealers in the United States.185 Thus, sales data is also
unlikely to be helpful in applying the common use test.
Perhaps the best form of data available to approximate firearm
ownership is survey data. However, even survey data is unlikely to
be sufficient for purposes of the common use test because most
polling questions about gun ownership are much broader than would
be helpful. Polls usually track questions like whether anyone in the
household owns “a gun” generally, without asking about the type.186
This type of information may be helpful in determining the size of
the total pool of gun owners to the extent that is relevant, but it is
unlikely to help courts get very far when it comes to determining
whether weapons with very specific features are in common use.
Although one could argue that the existence of the common use
test will lead to the creation of more robust data in the future, that
is unlikely to occur because data on firearms sales and ownership is
deliberately cloaked in secrecy by the firearms industry and pro-gun
groups. Unlike many other industries, trade groups representing the
firearm industry do not release sales data as a regular practice.187
Moreover, pro-gun groups have actively—and successfully—lobbied
against any efforts by the federal government to gather data on
firearm sales through its background check system or other
means.188 Similarly, the gun lobby has successfully suppressed

185. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, &
EXPLOSIVES, REPORT OF ACTIVE FIREARMS LICENSES—LICENSE TYPE BY STATE
STATISTICS 2 (July 10, 2014) (showing just over 140,000 federally licensed firearms
sellers), available at https://www.atf.gov/file/17071/download.
186. See, e.g., Washington Post-ABC News poll April 11–14, 2013, WASH. POST,
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/washington-post-abc-news-poll-april11-14-2013/105/ (asking whether “you or anyone in your house own a gun or not?”)
(last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
187. See Josh Horwitz, When It Comes to Data on Firearm Sales, Gun Lobby Still
Shooting Blanks, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2012, 7:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/josh-horwitz/when-it-comes-to-data-on_b_1256769.html (noting that while
“[v]irtually every other industry in America offers the media actual data on sales[,]”
the firearm industry does not).
188. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(3) (2014) (forbidding the FBI or any other
government agency from using background check data “to establish any system for
the registration of firearms, firearm owners, or firearm transactions or dispositions
. . . .”); Robert Draper, Inside the Power of the N.R.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/magazine/inside-the-power-of-the-nra.html (“[A]
chief talking point of the gun lobby was that universal background checks might
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federal funding for research on firearms, which will make it less
likely that more rigorous, detailed studies will be done on gun
ownership patterns.189 Thus, it is unlikely that, even with the
common use test in place, a new source of data will emerge to help
courts evaluate whether particular weapons pass that test.190

enable a government agency to compile a national registry . . . .”); Amanda Terkel,
Federal Gun Registry Is The New Death Panels, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 17, 2013,
1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/17/federal-gunregistry_n_3101204.html (“In the days leading up to Wednesday’s Senate vote on gun
legislation amendments, the talking point that has taken off most amongst
conservatives as a reason to oppose the background check compromise is that it
would lead to a national database of gun owners.”); see also James W. Porter II,
Registered Firearms Today; Confiscated Firearms Tomorrow, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N
INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.nraila.org/newsissues/articles/2014/4/registered-firearms-today-confiscated-firearms-tomorrow.aspx
(arguing that any system of registration will lead to “confiscation” of firearms).
189. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, §§ 218, 12
Stat. 786, 1085 (2011), 125 Stat 786, 1085 (“None of the funds made available [to the
Department of Health & Human Services] may be used, in whole or in part, to
advocate or promote gun control.”); Michael de Leeuw, Let Us Talk Past Each Other
for a While: A Brief Response to Professor Johnson, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1647
(2013) (noting that after the quoted appropriations language was first adopted in
1996, “[r]ightly (or wrongly) the CDC took this admonition seriously and essentially
stopped all research into firearms-related health issues.”); Michael Luo, N.R.A.
Stymies Firearms Research, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/26guns.html (“The amount of money available
today for studying the impact of firearms is a fraction of what it was in the mid1990s, and the number of scientists toiling in the field has dwindled to just a handful
as a result, researchers say.”). Moreover, pro-gun groups’ suspicion of attempts to
gather data on firearm ownership may lead to lower response rates on any surveys
that are attempted to measure firearm ownership in more detail.
190. The only other potential source of firearms data is “gun tracing” conducted
by the FBI for local law enforcement in connection with criminal investigations. Gun
tracing tracks a particular weapon to its point of sale and does require recording the
exact type of firearm involved. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS TRACE DATA: ALABAMA 2 (2012),
https://www.atf.gov/sites/default/files/assets/statistics/tracedata-2012/2012-tracedata-alabama.pdf. However, that data has important limitations, including the fact
that the FBI only conducts traces on guns where it is requested by local law
enforcement agencies, therefore making the sample contained in the trace data not
random. See id. More fundamentally, trace data reflects the type of guns used in (or
suspected of being used in) crimes, whereas the common use test is concerned with
guns that are owned for lawful purposes. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Cuomo (NYSRPA), 990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 364–65 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).
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5. The Doctrinal Problem
The above problems could be dismissed as mere disagreements
with the policy results of the test if the test were somehow required
by the constitutional text. After all, a constitutional mandate’s
failure to work in practice should not give courts license to ignore it.
Even if the test were merely required by long-standing precedent,
that would at least provide some reason for trepidation in suddenly
going in a different direction. However, the common use test is not
mandated by the Constitution or precedent at all and is in fact
inconsistent with the other (more important) parts of Heller.
The Second Amendment’s text obviously contains no explicit
limitation on the type of “arms” it protects.191 As the court found in
Heller, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms . . . .”192 The Court, of course, would limit this broad
scope with the common use test. But the source of that test is not
purported to be the constitutional text, but rather the Court’s earlier
decision in Miller.193
However, the Court’s supposed reliance on Miller does not hold
up to scrutiny. Miller does not apply the common use test at all.
Instead, Miller found the short-barreled shotgun at issue
unprotected by the Second Amendment because it was not “any part
of the ordinary military equipment . . . [and] could [not] contribute to
the common defense.”194 This is a test tied to that Court’s conception
of the Second Amendment as having the “obvious purpose to assure
the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia]
forces . . . .”195 Only after making that clear, does the Court mention
“that ordinarily when called for service [men serving in the militia]
were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of
the kind in common use at the time.”196 This one sentence hardly
represents the creation of a common use test, particularly when the

191. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
192. 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008).
193. See id. at 623–27; see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 419 (2009) (“Although
[extending the protection of the Second Amendment only to arms in common use] is
probably in line with contemporary popular understanding of the Second
Amendment, it is difficult to justify based on a categorical reading of the
Amendment’s text or original understanding.”).
194. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (alteration in original).
195. Id. (“[The Second Amendment] must be interpreted and applied with that
end in view.”).
196. Id. at 179.
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Court applied a completely different test in actually determining the
outcome of the case.
Moreover, in other aspects of its analysis, the Heller Court went
to great lengths to criticize and undermine any precedential value
Miller may have had. The Court noted that “[i]t is particularly
wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the
case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the
Second Amendment.”197 The Court explained that Miller was decided
under strange circumstances because the defendants made no
appearance in the case, so the Court only heard from the
government.198 This fact alone was “reason enough,” for the Court in
Heller, “not to make [Miller] the beginning and the end of this
Court's consideration of the Second Amendment[].”199 The Court also
criticized Miller as a source of the meaning of the Second
Amendment because it contained “[n]ot a word (not a word) about
the history of the Second Amendment.”200
In light of the Court’s finding that Miller was completely
unworthy of reliance in determining the central question in Heller, it
makes no sense to twist Miller’s language in knots to divine the
meaning of the term “arms” in the Second Amendment. Whether the
Court wanted to explicitly admit it or not, Miller was relying on a
collective understanding of the Second Amendment that the Heller
Court was abandoning. Therefore, there was no need or reason for
the Court to have relied on Miller in determining any part of the
scope of the new individual right it was recognizing.201

197. Heller, 554 U.S. at 623.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 624.
201. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2014),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted)
(“[S]ome cases are more equal than others. That’s because, with Heller on the books,
the Second Amendment’s original meaning is now settled in at least two relevant
respects. First, Heller clarifies that the keeping and bearing of arms is, and has
always been, an individual right. Second, the right is, and has always been, oriented
to the end of self-defense. Any contrary interpretation of the right, whether
propounded in 1791 or just last week, is error. What that means for our review is
that historical interpretations of the right’s scope are of varying probative worth,
falling generally into one of three categories ranked here in descending order: (1)
authorities that understand bearing arms for self-defense to be an individual right,
(2) authorities that understand bearing arms for a purpose other than self-defense to
be an individual right, and (3) authorities that understand bearing arms not to be an
individual right at all.”); see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 259 (1983)
(“[T]he ‘ordinary military equipment’ criterion is infected by Miller’s conceptually
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The common use test is also in some tension with the asserted
central purpose of the right to keep and bear arms identified by
Heller. The Court repeatedly described the right (or at least its core
component) as the “the inherent right of self-defense . . . .”202
However, the common use test has nothing whatsoever to do with
self-defense. Its origin is in the way people served in militias at the
time of the founding, while its application in the modern context
focuses on market share. While both of these things might be
tangentially related to self-defense,203 neither is directly tied to
modern self-defense in any meaningful way. A gun can become
popular for reasons that have nothing to do with its usefulness for
self-defense, such as cost, heavy marketing, or usefulness for some
other purpose (i.e., sports shooting). Conversely, a gun (or other
weapon) that is unpopular may nevertheless be highly useful for
self-defense. The test for determining what arms are protected
should not be so divorced from the right’s central self-defensive
purpose.
B. Proposed Alternatives to The Common Use Test
I am not the first to criticize the common-use test, and a few
alternative approaches have been suggested. However, each of these
alternatives204 suffers from its own deficiencies that make it an
unsatisfying choice to replace the common-use test. One test would
ask whether a particular firearm is a “descendant” of a firearm that

flawed concentration on the amendment’s militia purpose, to the exclusion of its
other objectives.”).
202. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628; see, e.g., id. at 599, 606, 616 (“The prefatory clause
does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued
the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense
and hunting. . . . [Although] self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification;
it was the central component of the right itself. . . . Tucker elaborated on the Second
Amendment: ‘This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . . The right
to self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of
rulers to confine the right within the narrowest limits possible. . . . It was plainly the
understanding in the post–Civil War Congress that the Second Amendment
protected an individual right to use arms for self-defense.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
203. The weapons used in the militia at the time of the founding were probably
similar to weapons used for self-defense, and today’s consumer preferences in
firearms probably in some ways reflect self-defense preferences.
204. This does not purport to be an exhaustive list of all ideas that have been
suggested, but the ideas described in this section represent some of the major themes
that have been proposed.
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was in common use at the time of the founding.205 A second proposal
would tie protection of firearms to law enforcement’s firearm
choices.206 A third would ask whether a given weapon is materially
more dangerous than the handguns at issue in Heller.207
1. The Lineal Descendant Test
The lineal descendant test was proposed by some scholars prior
to Heller and at least implicitly embraced by the D.C. Circuit in the
opinion that was reviewed in Heller.208 Although there are several
variants of it, this approach, either in addition to or instead of the
common-use test, asks whether the weapon at issue is one that is
“lineally descended from the kinds of weaponry known to the
Founders.”209 While this approach has the virtue of some link to
history, it would create more problems than it would solve.
The lineal descendent test is unlikely to be a good solution
because it is unworkable and just as disconnected from the central
purpose of the Second Amendment right as the common use test.210
The practical difficulty lies in determining which guns are in fact
“descendants” of founding era weapons. In some sense, every modern
firearm is descended from some earlier weapon because of the
inherently iterative nature of all technological development. The test
must necessarily be narrower than that. But what aspect of a
firearm makes it a descendant? The D.C. Circuit seemed to think
today’s semi-automatic handguns are lineal descendants of colonial
era muskets.211 But would a 3D printed handgun that is otherwise
identical to other modern handguns similarly be considered a
descendant? Do large capacity ammunition magazines count as
lineal descendants because firearms at the time of the founding also
had some amount of bullets? If so, would that mean that any
capacity magazine (i.e., a 100 round magazine) would necessarily be
a lineal descendant? These questions are extremely difficult to

205. See Kates, supra note 201, at 259.
206. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1411–12.
207. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1481–83.
208. See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 398 (2007); Jerry Bonanno, Comment,
Facing the Lion in the Bush: Exploring the Implications of Adopting an Individual
Rights Interpretation of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, 29
HAMLINE. L. REV. 463, 484 (2006); Kates, supra note 201, at 259.
209. See Kates, supra note 201, at 259.
210. To the extent this test is simply added to the common use test (i.e., by
requiring that a weapon be lineally descended in addition to being in common use) it
retains many of the problems the common use test has on its own, discussed supra.
211. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 398.
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answer and would likely devolve into an arbitrary line drawing
exercise.212
More problematically, this test suffers from the same problem
that the common use test does in that it disconnects the scope of the
word “arms” from the self-defensive purpose of the right. Whether a
particular weapon is a lineal descendant of a weapon in use at the
time of the founding (however courts would ultimately end up
applying that test), has little relationship to whether that weapon
would be helpful for modern self-defense. Consider, for example, the
taser. Tasers generally work by shooting “two small, needle-like
tethered probes 135-160 feet-per-second into the skin or clothing of a
target using compressed nitrogen. The probes instantly emit a
pulsating, electrical charge on contact that lasts an uninterrupted
five to seven seconds[]” in order to (non-lethally) subdue the
target.213 It would be hard to argue that tasers are descended from
any kind of weapon that would be familiar to the founders, and yet,
they can be highly useful to modern people for self-defense—perhaps
even more so than a handgun.214 The lineal descendant test simply
replaces the common use test’s misplaced focus on popularity with a
misplaced inquiry into firearms history that remains disconnected
from the Second Amendment right’s central purpose.
2. The Law Enforcement Test
Another intriguing test suggested in the scholarship is to tie
which weapons are protected by the Second Amendment to those
that are commonly used by law enforcement.215 Different proposals

212. See John Zulkey, Note, The Obsolete Second Amendment: How Advances in
Arms Technology Have Made the Prefatory Clause Incompatible with Public Policy,
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 213, 232, 232 n.138 (2010) (“Given that technology does
not have clear-cut predecessors and family lines the way humans and animals do,
there is no objective test to determine which weapons are or are not the lineal
descendants of revolutionary-era weapons.”); see also Volokh, supra note 24, at 1477
(“The trouble with [a lineal descendants test] is that all civilian firearms are in some
ways both modifications of military firearms and technological advancements on past
civilian firearms.”).
213. Wright, supra note 127, at 163–64.
214. See id. at 181–89 (arguing that tasers are particularly useful for selfdefense because of the lessened likelihood compared with firearms that they will be
used to injure the user or injure someone else unlawfully); see also Lerner & Lund,
supra note 153, at 1398 (“Judged by ease of use and minimization of harm, pepper
spray and Tasers are generally superior to traditional lethal weapons, such as
handguns and shotguns.”).
215. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1411–12; O’Shea, supra note 168, at
391–92.
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have incorporated this concept differently into various tests;216 but
the basic idea is that if a weapon is commonly issued to police to
carry out law enforcement functions, then that is strong evidence
that it qualifies for protection under the Second Amendment.
Proponents of this test argue, probably correctly, that it would solve
the under-protection problem because governments are unlikely to
bar their police from adopting new useful self-defense weapons even
if governments might be inclined to ban civilian possession of those
weapons.217 However, the test would create numerous other
problems.
The main issue is that police and civilians are not at all similarly
situated with respect to self-defense. Unlike civilians, police are
highly trained in how to operate their firearms under particularly
stressful circumstances.218 Also unlike civilians, police, by the nature
of their job, may put themselves into dangerous combat-like
situations and may also make themselves targets for heavily armed
criminals. For these reasons, it may be more appropriate for police
officers to carry deadlier weapons than would likely be necessary for
civilian self-defense needs.
Moreover, rendering police unable to possess better weapons
than those available to the general population would encourage an

216. Professor O’Shea’s proposal calls for looking to both the popularity of a
weapon among the general public (i.e., the common use test) and to the popularity of
a weapon among police departments. O’Shea, supra note 168, at 391–92. Professors
Lerner & Lund would have the courts “adopt a presumption that civilians may
employ self-defense technologies in widespread use by the police,” which would be
“rebuttable by sufficiently strong evidence that a particular device is suitable for
police work but not for civilian use.” Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1411–12.
217. See O’Shea, supra note 168, at 391.
218. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768, 798–99 (D. Md. 2014) (citations
omitted) (“In Maryland, law enforcement officers who wish to carry firearms must
successfully complete the applicable firearms classroom instruction, training, and
qualification. They must then submit to firearms training every year thereafter. If
the officers do not submit to the required annual training, their firearms are seized
until the training is completed. In addition to receiving extensive training on the use
of firearms generally, law enforcement officers must receive further specialized
training to use assault weapons. They are taught how and when assault weapons
may be used, as well as techniques to minimize the risk of harm to innocent civilians.
Even after they have received this training, they must undergo periodic
requalification to continue carrying assault weapons in the line of duty. Retired law
enforcement officers have also received training on the use of LCMs; in particular,
they have been taught how to assess each shot for effectiveness and how to evaluate
the circumstances before continuing to fire additional rounds. Finally, they have
received judgment training on the use of deadly force and how to safely handle and
store firearms, including in their homes.”).

52

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:XXX

arms race between police and criminals. If every time the police get
a new sophisticated weapon, that weapon must be made available to
the public, then criminals will also gain access to that weapon,
leaving the police to look for a still more advanced weapon to regain
the upper hand. This cycle unfortunately already goes on to some
extent as it is, and there is no reason to create a test for Second
Amendment analysis that would further encourage it.219
3. The Handgun Dangerousness Test
One approach that has been suggested—and the one that is most
similar to my own proposal—asks whether the weapon at issue is
materially more dangerous than a handgun or other weapon already
in common use.220 The idea is because weapons in common use, such
as handguns, were already approved by Heller, then any weapons
that are of equivalent or lesser dangerousness than those guns
should be allowed.221 Conversely, any weapons that are more
dangerous than those already approved in Heller should be
unprotected because the exemplar weapons Heller listed as
unprotected (machine guns and sawed-off shot guns) are more
dangerous than handguns in common use.222
This test makes sense to a certain degree; it would have the
positive effect of bringing some of the attention back to the weapons
themselves and their dangerousness instead of ancillary concerns
like market share and each weapon’s history. However, its main
problem is that it does not completely walk away from the concept of
common use, which still leaves intact many of the problems
discussed above.
Additionally, the test’s singular focus on dangerousness probably
would create some issues. For example, a weapon may be developed
(or may already exist) that is more dangerous than a handgun but
more useful for self-defense. Under this test, because the weapon is

219. It might be argued by some that putting the police and civilians on equal
footing is exactly what the Second Amendment was intended to do (i.e., to create a
bulwark against tyranny). See, e.g., David Pittman, Note, Heller: A Bulwark Against
Tyranny, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 201, 202 (2009). However, this purpose of the Second
Amendment right was not endorsed by Heller, with the Court acknowledging that “it
may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day
bombers and tanks.” See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
220. See Michael S. Obermeier, Comment, Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms”
Under the Second Amendment, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 718–20 (2012); Volokh, supra,
note 24, at 1481–83.
221. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1481–82.
222. See id.
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considered more dangerous than a handgun, it presumably could be
banned without examining its self-defensive utility. Or, on the other
side of the coin, this approach would not allow much room for safety
regulations on handguns because it begins with the assumption that
the handguns that were in use at the time Heller was decided, or
anything else equivalently dangerous, are untouchable. This would
be true even if the safety regulations at issue did nothing to interfere
with the utility of handguns.
Dangerousness is a particularly nebulous concept in the area of
weapons. Every weapon is—by design—dangerous. And often, the
more dangerous a weapon is, the more effective it is for selfdefense.223 A better rule would go deeper than asking about
dangerousness alone and instead ask why a particular weapon is
dangerous.224
C. The Reasonable Self-Defense Approach
To determine whether a weapon is protected by the Second
Amendment, courts should be guided by a test that is directly tied to
that right’s purpose of self-defense. Accordingly, I propose the
following test: Is the weapon at issue a reasonable choice for lawful,
armed self-defense? A court could consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining reasonableness, including:
A weapon’s usefulness for self-defense. How well does the
weapon stop attackers? Can a person under duress easily use the
weapon?
The weapon’s dangerousness to the user or innocent bystanders.
Does the weapon have a record of malfunctioning? Can it be easily
accessed and used by children? Does the type of ammunition
involved have more destructive power than necessary for selfdefensive purposes?
The weapon’s propensity to be used in mass shootings. Does the
weapon allow the shooter to fire many rounds very quickly with
minimal recoil?

223. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo (NYSRPA), 990 F. Supp. 2d
349, 368 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (“There thus can be no serious dispute that the very
features that increase a weapons’ utility for self-defense also increase its
dangerousness to the public at large.”).
224. Michael Obermeier, in his insightful comment on this issue, recognized as
much by pairing his proposed dangerousness comparison to handguns with asking
whether “the innate characteristics of the weapon . . . generally favor legitimate
purposes, such as self-defense or hunting, over criminal ones.” See Obermeier, supra
note 220, at 684.
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A weapon’s propensity or potential to be used for other unlawful
purposes. Weapons like entirely plastic guns designed to avoid metal
detectors or guns with the serial numbers removed225 could be
examples of weapons with such a potential.
All of these factors would be judged in the context of the universe
of weapons that remain available in light of the law at issue (i.e., the
available alternatives). These are not necessarily a complete list of
the factors courts could rely on in determining reasonableness,226 but
the basic point would always be to protect those weapons that allow
users to defend themselves227 well with minimal risk to themselves
and the community at large.
The main advantage of this approach over the common use test
and other suggested tests is that it is directly tied to the purpose of
the right. Under this test, in any type of weapon case, the focus both
of the arguments between the parties, and the court’s ultimate
decision would be squarely on what the weapon involved actually
does. In a case challenging an assault weapons ban, the court would
consider whether a weapon with the characteristics prohibited by
the statute is a reasonable choice for self-defense, rather than
searching in vain for market share statistics. In a case challenging
consumer safety requirements for handguns, a court would consider
whether guns without the required safety features are reasonable

225. Cf. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Firearms
without serial numbers are of particular value to those engaged in illicit activity
because the absence of serial numbers helps shield recovered firearms and their
possessors from identification.”).
226. Litigants could also have the opportunity to convince courts to consider the
geographical scope of a particular ban in determining reasonableness. For example, a
city defending a city-wide ban on a particular type of arm could argue that the
weapon is not a reasonable choice for self-defense in a densely populated city, or a
plaintiff challenging a ban on a particular weapon type in a more rural area could
argue that a higher degree of firepower is necessary where police response times may
be higher. In either case though, geography would likely be of little weight compared
to the intrinsic characteristics of the weapon and how those characteristics bear on
the weapon’s capacity for self-defense because confrontations requiring self-defense
probably are not extremely dissimilar even in different places.
227. Or perhaps, engage in other lawful firearm related activities such as
hunting. Although the Court described the central component of the right as the
right to self-defense, it left open the possibility that other uses of firearms could be
protected. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (“The prefatory clause does not
suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the
ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and
hunting.”). My proposal would apply equally in the event such a right to use arms for
hunting is recognized, with the question slightly modified to whether the weapon at
issue is a reasonable choice for lawful hunting purposes.
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self-defense choices, rather than grappling with what level of
generality defines a “handgun.” Simply put, the reasonable selfdefense test allows litigants to have an argument about what
actually matters: the relationship between the weapons and selfdefense.
Another advantage is that this test would be much easier for
courts to apply than the common use test. Unlike the common use
test’s reliance on statistics of questionable value and availability,
applying the self-defense test would require only looking at
information that is readily available, either in the form of empirical
data or expert testimony. In fact, courts have already been relying
on this sort of information in purporting to conduct the second step
of the analysis (selecting or applying the appropriate level of
scrutiny) in type of weapons cases. As described above in Part IV, in
Heller II, NYSRPA, and Fyock, the courts upheld bans on assault
weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines based on factors
including those weapons’ propensity for use in mass shootings,228
their usefulness for self-defense,229 and the likelihood of the weapons
injuring bystanders.230 Similarly, in James, where the court simply
ignored the common use test, the court based its dangerousness
analysis on similar kinds of evidence.231 The reasonable self-defense

228. See, e.g., NYSRPA, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (“Studies and data support New
York’s view that assault weapons are often used to devastating effect in mass
shootings.”); Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“[A]ssault weapons account for a larger share of guns used in mass murders and
murders of police, crimes for which weapons with greater firepower would seem
particularly useful[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. See, e.g., Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (finding a ban on large capacity ammunition magazines satisfies intermediate
scrutiny in part because “studies of the NRA Institute for Legislative Action
database demonstrate[e] that individuals acting in self-defense fire 2.1–2.2 shots on
average.”).
230. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1263–64 (“[H]igh capacity magazines are
dangerous in self-defense situations because the tendency is for defenders to keep
firing until all bullets have been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the
household, passersby, and bystanders.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. See People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 585–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“The
.50 caliber BMG rifle has the capacity to destroy or seriously damage vital public and
private buildings, civilian, police and military vehicles, power generation and
transmission facilities, petrochemical production and storage facilities, and
transportation infrastructure. These are not the types of weapons that are typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as sport hunting or selfdefense; rather these are weapons of war.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
Kampfer v. Cuomo, although the court did not explicitly rely on any specific piece of
evidence about the weapons at issue, it did rely on the fact that the weapons left
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test would allow courts to be honest about what their methodology
and use this evidence to assess whether the weapons should be
protected at all.
Courts are also very institutionally familiar with the concept of
objective reasonableness as a standard. Courts already routinely ask
whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk a
suspect,232 whether a person exercised reasonable care,233 or whether
a reasonable person would believe a contract has been formed.234 In
the context of self-defense in criminal law, courts already apply a
proportionality analysis that asks whether the defendant used an
amount of force that was “not excessive in relation to the threatened
force” against him or her.235 Applying a similar reasonableness
standard to firearms that asks whether the chosen firearm is
excessive in relation to a more generalized conception of the threats
people face would not be a large leap for courts to make. This is in
stark contrast to the mostly unfamiliar concept of common use.
Some may critique this proposal as allowing courts too much
discretion in determining which weapons are protected.236 However,
the common use test already allows at least as much discretion by
allowing courts to define the level of generality at which a weapon’s
commonality will be measured and by allowing courts to pick and
choose between different points of largely suspect data in deciding
how to measure common use. Moreover, the description of certain
supposedly long-standing exceptions to Second Amendment
protection recognized in Heller already represented some amount of
subjective balancing, even if the Court did not admit it.237
Essentially, almost any test will have a certain amount of
subjectivity to it, so the test courts choose might as well be one that
is actually connected to the right Heller recognized and one that will

available by the ban in that case gave citizens the ability to defend themselves. See
993 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2014).
232. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
233. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 127 (2d ed. 2011).
234. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 31 (2004).
235. E.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 377 (1996).
236. See Gregory T. Helding, Stop Hammering Fourth Amendment Rights:
Reshaping the Community Caretaking Exception with the Physical Intrusion
Standard, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 133 n.64 (2013) (“Legal scholars and jurists alike
agree that reasonableness is a malleable standard[.]”) (collecting sources); see also
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (criticizing Justice Breyer’s dissent for
proposing “a judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry . . . .’”).
237. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1572–73
(2009).
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force courts to point to available objective evidence to support their
conclusions.
In fact, at least one court has successfully evaluated similar
considerations to those proposed by the reasonable self-defense test
in a Second Amendment type of weapon case by relying largely on
objective facts. In Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper,238 the
court heard a challenge to Colorado’s ban on magazines capable of
holding more than fifteen rounds of ammunition.239 Unlike the other
cases discussed above, which were either decided at the preliminary
injunction or summary judgment stage, the court held a bench trial
where it heard testimony from numerous expert witnesses about the
self-defense utility of the banned magazines.240 The court also
considered other evidence bearing on whether the banned magazines
were an appropriate choice for self-defense, including the likelihood
of criminal use and whether using the magazines in self-defense
situations harms innocent bystanders.241
The Hickenlooper court fit this evidence into the analytical
framework as part of the second step of the analysis after concluding
that the weapons were in common use for purposes of the first
step.242 Nevertheless, the court’s approach is an example of how
courts could apply a reasonable self-defense test by carefully
examining evidence presented by the parties about the self-defensive
potential of the weapons at issue—perhaps in some cases, as in
Hickenlooper, with a full bench trial. Although weighing competing
expert testimony and other evidence can be a somewhat subjective
exercise, a court—like the one in Hickenlooper—will at least be able
to articulate the objective facts that gave rise to its decision.
Another objection to this test might be that allowing courts to
consider the existence of available alternative weapons is
inconsistent with Heller. Heller did reject the District of Columbia’s
argument that the availability of long guns should allow the ban on
handguns to survive.243 However, the Court’s reasons for rejecting
this argument are instructive. Although the Court again reiterated
how common handguns were, it also recited several reasons why

238. 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1050–51 (D. Colo. 2014).
239. Id. at 1054–56. The court also considered a Second Amendment challenge to
a law requiring background checks for private transfers of firearms and a vagueness
challenge to the grandfather clause for non-compliant magazines possessed prior to
the ban’s enactment. Id. at 1056–58.
240. Id. at 1069–72.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1069. The court ultimately concluded that the ban satisfied
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1073–74.
243. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
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handguns were preferable to long guns for self-defense, including
ease of use and accessibility in an emergency.244 In other words, the
available alternative—long guns—was unsatisfactory because the
banned weapon—the handgun—was a better choice for self-defense
for the reasons the Court articulated.
This is exactly the type of inquiry that the reasonable selfdefense test contemplates. It would not be enough for a court simply
to find that any alternative weapon existed. Rather, courts would
have to ask whether the banned weapon is a reasonable choice for
self-defense, given the available alternatives. Such a test would
necessarily require examining the capabilities and limitations of
those alternatives alongside the capabilities and limitations of the
banned weapons, just as the Court did in Heller.
Finally, it may be objected that this test has no relationship to
the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment regarding the
preservation of the militia. The common use test is at least
purportedly connected to the militia because people in the founding
era used the arms they had at home when they reported for militia
duty. However, the idea of connecting the content of the right to the
purpose stated in the prefatory clause was soundly rejected by
Heller.245 There is no reason for this one component of the right to
continue to be chained to the prefatory clause when the rest of the
right is completely unmoored from it. Instead, the content of the
“arms” portion of the right should be interpreted just like the rest of
the Second Amendment—with an eye toward self-defense, the
Second Amendment’s central purpose.
CONCLUSION
In the coming years, the issue of what types of guns and
accessories are protected by the Second Amendment is going to
become more and more salient. Whether it comes up in the form of
clashes over assault weapon bans, the imposition of mandatory
safety features on firearms, or the introduction of newer forms of
firearms and non-lethal weapons, the courts will need a framework
to sort out these claims.

244. Id. (“There are many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for home
defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for
those without the upper body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at
a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”).
245. See id. at 595–99.
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The common use test fails to provide a framework that is either
practical or connected to the purpose of the Second Amendment
right. Engaging in a difficult and likely arbitrary effort to assess the
popularity of contested weapons will not protect citizens’ ability to
engage in the armed self-defense Heller envisioned, nor will it
ensure that the most dangerous and unnecessary weapons are kept
off of the streets.
The implementation of a test based on whether a weapon is a
reasonable choice for lawful, armed self-defense will by no means
make these cases easy for courts to resolve. The question of whether
particular weapons would be more useful for self-defense or more
likely to hurt the innocent has been at the center of a vigorous and
contentious national debate for decades. But, at least by asking the
right question, litigants will be able to have an honest battle over
these issues in the courts, rather than being forced to engage in a
proxy argument about popularity.

